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ART-LANGUAGE

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VIOLINS AND COWS

There is no point in looking for a well-formed art structuralism - or an 'all-over' methodologically unambiguous monotheoretical model of art. In the nineteenth century, the high degree of mechanistic systematicness in the sciences provided the grounds for the vaunting of specious autonomy theses. The currently prevalent aspiration to produce such a 'structuralism' is commensurate with the deterministic non-castellated model used by the nineteenth century art historian...

The point is to consider what we learn/share. Whilst not rejecting the notion out of hand, it seems that we do want a space more tractable than a Husserl-popularist 'empathetic/ethical' space. This desiderate seems to lead to transformations of spaces. It is required of the indices that they be rich enough to catch transformations in a given space and transformations of given spaces. The same index should support both intraspatial and interspatial transformations. Whatever we want to have, there is some point in looking diachronically for possible relations in such spaces. The interesting thing, however, is that we are dealing with transformations of 'logical space' - not just transformations in a logical space...

... Generalized notion of learning as the compactness of any reference point i, but is not the redundancy of localization (re-interpretation) so that $x^i \neq x^j$...

We can suggest a (still provisional) definition of an item searched by the Art & Language Index = def. a $(\exists x)(\exists y)$(x is a member of A & L and x learns a from y and $x \neq y$). Here y may be a member of A & L in which case we would have y contributing to x's A & L heritage (index-providing status) or y need not be in A & L.

An alternative definition which catches the notion of sharing (people might be happy about this) would be found in:

Searched by the index of = def. A & L (x) (if x is a member of A & L then (($\exists y$) x learns a from y and $x \neq y$).

Now, it has already been pointed out that one of the features of our conversation (epistemic, etc. activity) is that some parts of it involve transformations of logical space, rather than merely transformations in a logical space. The former transformation is what the '(T)' in the index is supposed to express. It is appropriate to consider the index/map as permitting certain sorts of idiomatic talk. What we want to do is search the 'work' we can get hold of in such a way that some of the modalities in the conversation might be revealed.

Metaphysical problems of indexing without iterated modalities

An impressionistic semantic model? But this doesn't commit us to ultimately 'reduce' the citations, to the right hand side of the index, to psychology. For the left hand side the intra- and inter-set transformations are introduced as the (indexical) expressions of (a posteriori) facts of ideology. The generalizations out of, and into, a point of reference/proper name/possible world/an accessible fragment of the world is no more subject to a priori criteria of set consistency, compatibility and exhaustion than a pragmatic model a la Montague. That is, apart from 'historical-dialectical' (sic) arguments about the growth and development of indexing ... a 'logic' has to deal with the assumptions of complete/exhaustive descriptions (intensional-extensional) as wff (well formed formula) and providing a T-F mapping ⟶ calculus that's undecidable...We don't have problems of the decision theory in indexing (ipso facto) - maybe that's our last tautology...Anyway, mathematics (algebra) have their own scandals (to deal with) in their categorization of 'nature', and as nature; never mind the possibilia of the trans-world-heir-lines (identity?) expressible with '(T)' ... wff-ness and compactness of (the categories of) a point of reference is a MMi∈I situation. Axiomata are locked in a historical continuum just like any (±) mapping...

Now, one thing is that we can suggest a system of paranomic (this word is not altogether accidentally like 'paranoic') modalities. What we mean by this, really, is that in our conversation we don't want to make stronger modal claims than can be accomodated in an adjunct of the nomic context. Remember, we're talking about what we learn; so, perhaps we're dealing with modality interfaces. The modalities we are talking about subsist in the interfaces between alethic, boulomaic, deontic and evaluative modalities; this may seem pretty vague, but if you've done any work recently, try thinking about its Ordnuungscharakter. Anyway, it must be shown that the modalities an index might come up with are distinct from 'logical ones' - or maybe stronger logical ones. Maybe we have to consider both...

...An index set is seen as covering possibles. The necessities, or perhaps rules, apply to possibilities. But anyway, at this stage it might be argued that there is some way in which, as it were, the index set of any assertion involves the possible context of its application, or projection, or acceptance, etc.

There are some problems associated with the concepts of possible worlds, or possible individuals in terms of ontological status and identity. But ideological status is most use; the point is that we want to consider state-to-state transformations of context, etc. of what we and others have said.

...But really, faced with the elliptical situation of 'interpretation', we ought to shut up. This is the best way around the classical and orthodox objections to (non-orthodox) semantics (i.e. semantics as a (formal) theory of natural languages and as a formal language). However, a semantical aspect, or rather a 'series' of semantical aspects, seems to be reflected in our nature - that is, our natural language, our discourse and so on. And that is the absurditiy of a sophisticated ideological 'matrix' (through and past Kripke and Hintikka) that denies any ideological point of reference. (Ideology may be thought of, in a radically atomic way, as submerged in 'semantics'.) So, inasmuch as it would be paradoxical to say we have any problems, we'd better say 'we have a few approximations to a solution of the reflexivity of language.' Some suggestions for the quasi-solutions originally came from Abraham Robinson's non-standard semantic-model theory as interpretations of formal syntactical languages by approaching a modal logic. But the question comes up what sort of modalities (alethic, etc.) and how many of them? This is the nexus point of semantics and indexes; the axes of an index can be seen as the parameters of a pragmatical approach to natural languages...

...Or rather, we are faced with the - non-deontological (chronic) - ought of mapping if a parameter is not an approximation to a (highly generalizable) pragmatic situation ... The projectibility of a mapping has traditionally been the a priori weights attached to a complex (sic) inductive function. There is, however, a mutual dependence between the scalar and vector dimensions of a point of reference and its 'logical' transformations. Instead the values/ shopping list of modalities of any fragment of (pre-) language provides an ordinal wave! Whither anaphor?

A point of reference - as an atomic element of the world - is methodologically intractable; there is a localizing anaesthesia however.

What are these individuals? These are presumably what seem to be referred to by the individual citations, that is, the citations to the right of the 'original' of a document list, are, or rather contain, a sort of reference to the merely possible individuals which add up or constitute elements of the (original) point(s) of reference commensurate with the left hand index element - so the statements interpreted from the citation list on the right may lack a truth value, but need not.

Another thing is that the index logic (i.e. interpretations, etc.)

might (should) be free of existential assumptions. And anyway, some of the domains may be empty. Now, also, we need to sort out the problem of intensionality of modal contexts. The main ideal is to distinguish between modalities de dicto and de re - and show that names and definite descriptions behave differently in these contexts. The sentential-operator notion of modality (i.e. the de dicto) may be taken as basic and with the help of operators in common in propositional logic, de re modality is, or may be seen as, a special case of a more general kind of modality.

A basic idea in sorting out the logical modalities has been the idea that necessity is associated with 'truth in all possible worlds'. Now, it seems that we want the index to provide some instrumentalities so that an analogous notion may be mobilized in the context of our conversation, and conversational aspiration. The fact that we do talk to each other has been increasingly an important concern.

Anyway, 'world' is a bit much. Usually, 'point of reference' is better. In Professor Carnap's construction, the role of index (possible world) is filled by state descriptions. Now, it could be argued that what the index does contain is state descriptions; it would be best here to call them 'histories'. A 'state description' characterizes completely a logically possible (conversational) state of affairs - not necessarily at one instant of time. It does this to the limit of its primitive predicate(s) and names. The histories might well do the same. The histories 'describe' the 'basic' possible facts. This doesn't mean that non-modal 'statements' (index entries perhaps) formed solely in terms of non-analyzed (sufficiently clear) predicates and names don't have modal implications - they do. And we could arrange for further such implications by putting restrictions on histories (and on later entities to be constructed) in the way that Professor Carnap put restrictions on 'state descriptions' by using meaning postulates. So a history, '(±) A123)', etc., is a basic level of description in a syntactic sense - but, also, non-analyzed properties have a semantical and epistemological dimension. If the 'histories' are seen as representing alternative logically possible states of affairs, we might expect that a statement, or statement set, or string of interconnected sentences is paranomically a necessity, or, at least, has a certain 'weight' if and only if it holds all members of a subset of the set of histories where that subset is considered to 'correspond' to Art & Language discourse in some way.

We can't always 'internally' systematize what kind of 'necessity' we mean; it's our problem to get a lot of general regularities or not get them; it might be said that we deal with a cross-modal abstraction.

The histories in that subset represent the paranomically possible alternative histories. Other subsets represent other notions about what is paranomically possible, i.e. involve a transform out of the space. The other subset simply allows transformations in that space. It would be alright to call each such subset a reference point, and reference points represent theoretically (logically) possible determinations of what is paranomically possible . . .

. . . The (epistemo)logical products/problems of the index don't raise the old criteria of adequacy solution of operationalism . . . Funnily enough the history of the metaphysics might suggest we *are* dealing with nature (and directly). Rationality has (always) remained uninterpreted - uninterpretable - in the Hegelian equation: actual (world) = the rational. We have instead 'actualization'. N.B. the vectoral assumptions are - or rather conditions - functions for the continuity of (an actualized) reality . . . but even our rules/ axiomata are dependent on memory (i.e. = □ revision). Natural necessity applies to possibility and counterfactuals don't get into the index. . .

. . . There's a difficulty; maybe we can't any longer identify an alethic necessity with that which holds in every history. The reason is that there will no doubt be alethically necessary statements available from the index in which paranomic ones appear. But for paranomic statements we can't give a criterion for holding in a history since the same history appears at different reference points (i.e. in subsets of the set of histories). Whether a statement is paranomically acceptable does not depend just on a given history, but on the alternatives to that history, i.e. on which reference point is being considered. What's needed is a hierarchical structure for alternative possibilities. As well as breakdowns of a simple reference theory to provide the meaning of 'propositional attitudes' (that is, where and how do you pick out your individuals in opaque areas?), we've got the problem of proliferation of possibilities concerning the actualized world. This point rests upon both the features of attitudes - which are planning, constructing and disagreeing - and the truth-value foundation (or primitives) of modalities, necessarily and possibly. In crude terms the problems are not only of realizations of different possibilities but an achievement to make a world which would match the real logical possibility and an 'apparent' (linguistical) possibility (cf. Hintikka). We could bring in essentialism, but this is suspect itself in the context of modalities. (It also makes the claims for opacity footless. But that would only occur in the dreams of a diachronic - worse, pure competence/non-performance. . .world of cyberneticians.) There is a weaker type of general essentialism, i.e. identity through the (unmapped-unmappable) modalities of non-difference - perhaps opacity is a bit much, despite the fact that indexically you are working-in-the-limit. The points of reference are not ersatz possible worlds in the index. Whatever historicity a set may have - embedding, etc. - what it 'tells us' prevents indexes becoming objects of pure phenomenalistic contemplation.

(Historically it can be challenged that a (in a metamathematical or intuitional situation) the model of a formal system is the appropriate ordering of the procedure. For example, if this procedure were applied in function theory, in respect of consistency and completeness, it might lead to separate definitions of continuity for each function. This is a standard traditional problem of axiomatics, the interpretations of formal systems being isomorphic. So we don't get, and shouldn't expect, necessarily, standard models for interpretation. If we are in need of one definition of what constitutes a model of a given system we should not expect only one helpful answer (cf. 'The Ontological Significance of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem').)

...So when principles rather than mere facts about the conversation are considered, 'reality' (from the point of view of conversation) may correspond to point of reference R, with one of its histories representing the matters of fact, or to point of reference R1, with one of its histories representing the matters of fact; these are reference point structures. A sentence expressing 'paranomic conversation' necessity holds in a point of reference structure just if that which is deemed necessity holds in every point of reference structure R containing the same point of reference as R.

Redemption not Adaptation

We may have to deal with set membership as an affirmation. Certainly, we'll have to cope with resonances along any wave-like parameter of conditionship. Set membership is not - cannot be - trivial ... neither can we accept any forgone conclusion over set membership ... the set can't be thought to be 'closed' save as a point of reference ... in the margin of the index. Perhaps a point of reference is a path ... ideology/'lived through' and can't have any identity (membership) criteria except with an iterated range of modalities - of that ideological point. Similarly as a point and not an atomic element, it operates as a function on a rational time dimension of belonging to a set (AL); this pseudo-reflexivity (Kaplan's solution for paradoxes remains, for us, on the surface - and so a paradox resolved) is hybridity. But as that pseudo-reflexivity is non-paradoxical, via an iteration from a list of pragmatic aspects (of the work, the discourse, yourself), you have the possibility of sameness with respect to any subset of the ideology set 'I' - similarly with different sets embedded in 'I'. Yet the depth vector/function of that reflexivity is unknown only iterated ... as a point of reference not a dynamic. With hybridization 'sameness', ($\{i_1\} = \{i_2\}$) may be a possibility, only through the necessity of a revitalized, revitalizing vector ... (H, H^o, H^{oo}, h^o, h^{oo}).

So we're still left with the teleological problems - and they proliferate: 'going-on' moves us away from 'grammar' and 'grammaticality'. 'Why our system is not tautologically mystical' ... 'how it could not be possible to revise a system' ... that would be a mysticism of a kind - of the kind that lets syntax (rules - conditionality - defence - completeness) in any formal mode remain 'on the page' in some way ... and thinking it gave (an undecidable) description of the world. Back to 'what is a problem?' Are our injunctions to the idols just brought about by a difference of macrosociological inputs of the world of art? (Remember the possibility of '$=/\neq$' above.) Pseudo-problems and problems: our categorization of a set (of sets) AL_1 only partially excludes something in a funny sort of way. No, it doesn't even do that ... N.B. $(\exists x)M_1(x)$, where M = any modality from indifference to hatred to ... etc. Our set-inclusion belongs to a non-'semantics of natural languages' mood of ideology. 'Everything' is included/indexical to the set AL - in one embedded or non-iterative way or another.

Is this adaptation? Is this the escape from determinism? (Ideology is fixed by determinism.) After all we still have our reports/indices. What quasi-structural principles can we get away with for 'structure $\neq$ a closed system'? ... N.B. any structural items despite formal relations are resonant with each other ... i.e. $\{i = j\}$ k/ $\{i \neq j\}$ l, and provide the possibility of a generated set of same or different items 'e I^{G1}', which includes as 'same' or 'different' all past items.

That's what diachronic experience is -

Concatenata: they're not words or the morphs of linguistics ... they're a non-arbitrary detachment (whose depth we don't know) of a body (I e AL_1) discourse. The concatenata are (notoriously) ordinal - rationality is after the event - or an exhausted M I^{G1} (experience) and non-revisionary - or a tacit cardinality as a product of the vectors of going-on ... going-on as myth.

H is a dynamic set condition - characterizing unification. We can't determine or even exhaustively map these conditions. Any concatenation is relative to any set conditionality - unsaturated. In the absence of a possible teleonomic set - (T) - any expression of identity is (say) the product of two functions such that $T_1 = T_2$, you/we always 'have a difference'.

The 'same' and 'different' situation is only accessible a posteriori.

When H is completed (on the form) you can go to h which is the 'picture' with respect to the 'contrastive' index set. The present design is minimal ... i.e. Bx M$\longrightarrow$ $\{i < a\}$ $h \equiv \{i\}_1 \neq \{i\}_2$, $H \equiv \{i\}_1 = \{i\}_2$ ... set S' is open, with respect to a, b, c, etc. $\in$ S'. But 1 - n $\neq$ S'.

How it all is,is a mystery ... and so much for methodology ... this is no principle ... but why this ideology is ideology and revision ... or just functioning ideology, is a mystery and will perforce remain a mystery to methodology and relations.

Two Cal's between which may be found 'sames' as to form 'F'. Or what, indistinguishable? Iterative items, or what? ... There are other possibilities. We may say they are not worth the bother ... vis a vis distinction. They 'contribute' one way or another ... they may be just formal/existential. This needs looking at ... they may not be guessed, just recorded? Anyway, on we go to 'contribution'. Now, common features are accessible in the hybrid, i.e. go through the list ... and find these links, or fragments ... is that it?

The intermediate form of the hybrid ... this isn't state, is it? It must be wave like ... This is the 'dynamic principle' aspect/the go-on aspect - or is it? Do we note the former and press-on with the latter?

While hybridization is indivisible, it is present in one of n and only n modes ... is this 2? Oscillations of, in or out of phase ... no, these sets are daft; we need it more comfortable. How about a phase picture? That's computable. Zero scope sames ... are in phase. Non-sames are out of phase. Now, this is not just 'commonality' is it?

$$Cal_1 \longleftarrow H \longrightarrow Cal_2$$
$$Cal_1 \longleftarrow H^{a} \longrightarrow Cal_2$$

Now, this needs looking at. Property is merely thought of as functionality. So we have sameness and non-sameness ... formal of just AL dynamic ... entry sameness, or what with respect to going-on? You can have quite a list:

$Mode^{\alpha}$	1.	Cal_1 H Cal_2	$Mode^{\beta}$	4.	D Cal_1 H Cal_2
$Mode^{\beta}$	2.	Cal_1 H Cal_2	$Mode^{\alpha}$	5.	etc.
$Mode^{\alpha}$	3.	Surf Cal_1 H Cal_2	$Mode^{\beta}$	6.	etc.

When Cal_1 has both surf-scrutiny and function (D) scrutiny and Cal_2 has similarly surf and D. When 3 obtains, so does 6 (in the Bxal By Cal forms). Given concatenation/hybridity, which is single and indivisible, it is in the in phase mode between surf and surf, and at the same time in the contrasting (out of phase) mode between D and D, or it is in the converse mode.

The procedures of analysis/understanding involve two separate kinds of factors: a) the materials of a given state of discourse; b) the operators - no?

So, in concatenation, we have no choice but to confront each concatenatum with each other one ... and find the one 'bond' hybridity between two boundaries over and over in each separate confrontation. Now what? After a few pages of (mad) digression ... hybridity may have to be tactical ... a reinterpretation of a list: stairways of index sets - Darwinian descent.

A ⟶ B - M is true structure. $\{[A]\} \longrightarrow \{[B]\}$. But we want an interpretation for $\{A\} \longleftarrow H \longrightarrow \{B\}$ Cal. (What C. Smith suggested vis a vis transitivity?) Is it sufficient to have a guess principle? Are inter-list relations decidable? Finding a hybridity with respect to concatenation ... this might be a question of degree ... also offer R. Itself. Compatibility. A principle allowing filtration of a kind. The hybridity exists where? An address to the 'same' problem ... we can express zero hybridity - but what about 'low' epistemic access? There should be a way to avoid infinite hybridity. But expression of epistemic weakness would do. The H is an index with respect to the higher order list... a universe of non-discourse. In what ways can we talk of (epistemic) access? Unless you are dealing with it as prima facie, 'everything becomes message (at least as asymptote of noise)'. Epistemic weakness might be expressed by H/–H. It's all still an index of everyone's interests-imagination; there are no 'counterfactuals'.

You would find that concatenation is structural, but it's also resonance - that is, it's seldom, if ever, Bx → By Cal. In fact, it may have to be Bx → By Cal (so two lists perhaps). A concatenatory unit, the inside structure of which is mesomeric - express that in an alternative list.

From the point of view of resonance this may amount to no more than a semi-structural conjecture. This would make hardly any difference for a workable formalism (plus recognition of a limit). The question of bindability - morphisms just won't work in the absence of an 'ortho' approach. So, what is a possible 'resonance'? Interpretation? The H is then a 'unifying' view - a weakening? A single concept into which the pertinent features of both entities are incorporated? Now, it's a question of reading-off. But what? Just a unity guess (... this is why Mx/Phil. is right about going-on ... the boundaries ... out-of-the-blue). But we can't just 'weaken' the typology - is it a truism to say of any 'structure' that it's a true structure (from a list)? Compare the concatenata!

Concatenatum: should there be any information as to type? It's not just type that counts, in fact the information must be restricted to the 'interiority', so to speak, of the concatenatum (although we're dealing with a point of reference and not space). What we could try to set up is a form of hybridity. This is a question of a more elaborate hybridity structure (don't fear a precluded set - this is just the possibility of a set/data). So we have to get hybridity in the lists. Do we say whether they are the same or not the same, i.e. substitutable or contrastive? You could arrange suitable categories, i.e. 4^2 lists and then possible 'groupings' classification - a propos the Zurich 'guessing show'. The other thing would be to sort out hybridity 'later'. How do you do this - and what are the sets involved? It's just that the expressional possibility might be 'richer', and this must rely on a sort of hybridity. Same ... with respect to what? So as to get the resonating situation ... we also have 'slightly' different issues ... the logic/the hybridity exists insofar as we deal with 'present' possibilities, in expressions 'for' ... the concatenation occurrence ... its properties. The R is between sets ... but this is well away from 'explicit' hybridity. Is it just a question of ringing the changes on the lists?

Lines and prisms ... what else can one get it to say? 'It's the same conversation' is no good. We want more of a resonance ... how about working it out as a kind of anamorphism? A late concatenization? And then there's the problem of modalities ... spaces. So far, we have just a property ... don't we? Confront every item with every other ... this is a question of working out resonances/ vibrations.

n Bxal By Cal ... Cal. Properties have to be sorted out somewhere. Determine the property of M, or N's going-on, or being a going-on relation of some kind. B was 'blurt'.

'Mere' resonance, surely to God ... a structure ... with contributing members ...

A pattern of complementary distribution may or may not emerge; the operator can, presumably, set this up. We need a near 'complete' permutated list. Anyway, go-on with the hypothesized 'sameness'.

There are aspects of formal difference - do we have to see that (for '=')? There are concatenatory componential features in common.

Now, can we consider that there is no contrast with respect to the items' being functional signals? But functional property is 'same' or 'not-same'. Is that just agree/disagree?

$A\ \mathrm{Cal} \longleftarrow H^{S} \longrightarrow \mathrm{Cal}$ This isn't lucid.

$A \longleftarrow H^{S}\ \mathrm{Cal} \longrightarrow B$ This isn't lucid either.

An earlier datum - $A \longleftarrow H \xrightarrow{Ns} \mathrm{Cal}$ B. Now, can we postulate a rule of congruence? The resonance is between operators ... or between Art and Languagists - participants (as operators of M). Does this suggest any ideological revisionary true structures? This is a question of the incorporation of pertinent common features ... of concatenatory properties... What's the answer? A rule of congruence would suggest that:

$$A \longleftarrow H^{S}\ \mathrm{Cal} \longrightarrow B \equiv A \longleftarrow H^{Ns}\ \mathrm{Cal} \longrightarrow B \equiv \{I\}$$

We can't just have that sort of comparison; there may be other approaches. What we want is cyclical output.

We still have to investigate the possibility of encountering other I -

like concatenatory events, and their possible incorporation as to going-on into I, i.e. as contributing members. I (an ideological concatenatory possibility) might be defined as a true structure . the expression of reverberation between related items in (on) the A & L discourse map. Is this as anyone wants it? However, concatenatory events of a similar type do recur ... they can be regarded as contributory in some way.

According to the theory (quasi-theory), the patterns of distribution of concatenatory (grammatical) occurrences is statable as follows:

$$\mathrm{Cal}_1 \longleftarrow \mathrm{H}^{\mathrm{Ns}}\ \mathrm{Cal} \longrightarrow \mathrm{Cal}_2$$

There has to be a further adaption.(SIC) Where is the typical hybridity? When and where it is typical may be too stupid/complex for us to understand.

And, however, $\mathrm{Cal}_1 \longrightarrow \mathrm{H}^{\mathrm{S}}\ \mathrm{Cal} \longrightarrow \mathrm{Cal}_2$ is the use of a hybridity out of court.

We should continue with the ideas about the sets. There's some basis for using concatenation. So: C set , plus usable indices. Anaphora indices are fairly minimal with respect to power. 'Hello H', said Terry: C_1 H C_2.

The congruence problem - this may be a question of finding an analogue of the two hybridity planes. Coincidence with 'their' chat - a chance to modify the generatum of the grammar. We can postulate a 'weakness' somewhere, or perhaps a 'vast' or infinite resonance. Expression and ideas is all too silly. But you've got to reach some sort of analogue ... at least is it between ... discourse and universes of sets of discourse.

Cal ... B, etc. ... with suitable indices. Let's try out some modification on the operations. The indices can't be too behaviouristic. It can't be just about form and content. We could postulate a hybridity with 'content' - topic significance. And ideology - to show a possibility of ideology - our language (cf. Hegel). Take a part seriously ... just a pathway won't do ... It's got to grow (that is to say we can't slot in an independent result).

Might we just have no surface? A transformationally filterable surface? This is to say a filter concatenation ... or an ideological measure thereof - the possible relations of a range of several expressions. Ideology is not just 'attitude' or point of view.

This can be no less than concatenation. Now, back to the problem of the sets. Stress and syntactic ... transformations...

Our categories are not sets of expressions - but instead they serve as indices (of what axes?). The set of discourse items is to be the smallest set X such that Cal_1 and Cal_2 are in X. Another issue: whenever a and b are in X ... etc. (Montague).

The going-on function - we need more structure.

Cal ⟶/as categories.

We don't really have a basic set of expressions at all.

A set of basic teleological categories? Rehearse operator teleologically. An r ... they say if they are 'same', they create the hybridity. That's easy ... they can use consistent lists. If you can set up hybridity, there must be a congruence.

But one does want the hybridity. Can it be in terms of form and property? Surely not form corresponding to that which amounted to a point of reference/a 'way of life' set bounded just by description. It's still a question of building-up a picture ... but we don't have to take the 'findings' seriously. (Consider the G. Sperone form-filling situation!)

We can set up the concatenation list ... as a grammatical possibility. It can't be just a tactical issue we're dealing with.

We could sort out a set of conditions that would make us think of concatenation ... going-on as a popular fallacy. The effort must be to produce a logos situation ... where chat is chat...

Indices ... not just synoptic indices ... further activity is necessary - a) (F) H can be H i 'same', or you can have b) (F) h where i 'contrasting', and at the same time you get for a) a 'contrasting' and for b) a 'same'. Is this at all necessary now? That would just alter interpretation wouldn't it? Change the category perhaps? 'i' can, so to speak, 'explain'; 'a' has to be a dummy. There is index set congruence - in that case it 'has to be'. It's just a recondite publishing of results. If you've got an F 'contrasting' and an i 'same' and a Bxal 'contrasting', you've got to have a 'contrasting'. O.K.

Now for P's. The same follows with respect to congruence and also 'inside' congruence, i.e. where you get P 'contrasting', you get H 'same'.

So this is the first two stages for IBMR and the time? It's still guessing.

Now for the congruence breakdown. Anything with anything. Should that be left as a problem? No, but that is on the form - surely index congruence will hold it together. But why compare? Is it just a weakening or what? No, it's a new hypothesized concatenation ... saying not a lot.

That's not too bad. The more 'internal' congruences are Cal in a way. They have the text cardinalized. There is always problem-solving. How can the sets be preserved or found? The non-congruent thing is i set addition. But that's far-fetched ... T. M. Cheng ... what we have is a piece of going-on assembled... Could we have a chain? All this presumes synchronic/diachronic thinking.

And here you'd have an H^o that results in a straight C, except for the fact that the structural relation TAMB ⟷ IBMR is hybridized by its being missed by TAMB. So H^o is a form of Cal - but $\{i\}$, $\{b\}$ get in on the act in a 'contrastive' way - as a 'boundary' comparison.

You note, in other words, H^o and h^o.

Next there's H^{oo}.

Now this is $\{i\}$, $\{b\}$ coming home to roost. H^{oo} says $\{i\}_1 = \{i\}_2$, therefore $\{b\}_1 \neq \{b\}_2$. h^{oo} conversely.

The dummy index needs to be put through fairly arbitrarily - 'sprinkled'.

H^{oo} = anything and anything + congruence.

h^{oo} = ... + congruence.

S1	8-18/ 14-18	1,2,4,6,7,8,14,16, H5, H6	36,31,9,30 34,17,75,42	30,45,46 26,47,37,22

2

	A1	B1	C1	D1				
1	n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	/	6,18	34	(1)
2	n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	/	5,53	32	(2)
3	n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal				(3)
4	Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	/	36	37	(4)
5	n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal				(5)
6	n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	/	31	30	(6)
7	n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	/	9	45	(7)
8	Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	/	30	46	(8)
9	Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal				(9)
10	n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal				(10)
11	Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal				(11)
12	Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal				(12)
13	Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal				(13)
14	Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	/	34	26	(14)
15	n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal				(15)
16	Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	/	17	47	(16)

	A1H	B1H	C1H	D1H				
1	n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal				(1)
2	n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal				(2)
3	n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal				(3)
4	Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal				(4)
5	n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	/	75	37	(5)
6	n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	/	42	22	(6)

	H	1,2,4,5,6,7,11,14,16,H1,H4,H5,H6	90,82,52 29,66,10,22 [illegible],27,22	17,[illegible],17,27 11,[illegible],15,45 45,20,27,[illegible]	Ho	"	Ho,65, 29,36,57	13,37,1,24 32,32,37,37 [illegible] 36.
S2	12-20/ 21-22	h	14,29,22,22 29,66,69, [illegible],90,69	11,20,11, 27,18,37, 11,11,27,15	"	ho	ho	27,11,45,32 40,20,21 17,24,36
S3	6-16/ 17-21	5,9,11, H4	29,27, 27,52	6,21, 45,18	"	"	27,29, 29,66	23,36, 21,12

	A2	B2	C2	D2				
1	n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	/	90	37	(1)
2	n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	/	82	48	(2)
3	n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal				(3)
4	Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	/	52	17	(4)
5	n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	X	29	27	(5)
6	n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	/	66	11	(6)
7	n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	/	10	44	(7)
8	Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal				(8)
9	Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	\			(9)
10	n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal				(10)
11	Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	X	22	15	(11)
12	Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal				(12)
13	Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal				(13)
14	Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	/	28	45	(14)
15	n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal				(15)
16	Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	/	27	45	(16)

	A2H	B2H	C2H	D2H				
1	n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	/	27	20	(1)
2	n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal				(2)
3	n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal				(3)
4	Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	X	22	27	(4)
5	n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	/	27	11	(5)
6	n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	/	32	36	(6)

Brainstorm Proposal

0/1	1	1/2	2	2/3	3	3/4	4	4/5	5
That		is		Kantian		claptrap.		Haven't	
A		B		C		D		E	

5/6	6	6/7	7	7/n
you		learnt		anything...
F		G		H

A-H - a natural numbers series and given; 1-7 - concatenations - closed set (?); 1/2, etc. - of an open set (?).

$Bx^{Ii}(1) \neq Bj^{Ii}(A, B) = (?)\ Bj^{Ii}(0/1, 1/2)$. No! Hybridity!

$Bj^{Ii}(\ldots A^{Ij}H\ldots B)$ $Bx^{Ii}(1)$ MM Bj's ($\neq$ MiBx's!)

Apropos (...A...Hi...B...), fuck Zeno's paradox, or any other paradox.

1) Bx(1, 2) e Ii and Bx(3) $\in$ Ij: there is a set of conditions for a grammar of ($1 \longrightarrow 3 \longrightarrow \ldots$) as a set system I indexed a posteriori from i-n, and so ($1 \longrightarrow 3$, etc.) is 'frozen' at II.

2) Bx = a wff, closed set; Bj = an open (wff?) set and is a function of revision on Bx, i. But to the extent that (1) $\neq$ (A, B)? would be a silly question.

3)



4) Revision on the Bx grammar is such that any $Bx^i \neq Bj^i$, but $Bj^i =/\equiv MBx^i$; and 'revision' is $Bx^i \longrightarrow Bx^j$ $x^i(\ldots H\ldots)x^j$. MM $\{Bx \longrightarrow Bj\} = Bj \longrightarrow MBx$. That is, the architectonic is a product of the M of experience from both the indexing of a cluster to a (unhappy) Naturlogik continuum and as an historical-cultural phenomena as instrumentality.

$\{Bx \not\rightarrow Bj^{i}\} / Bx^{Bj^{i}}$

Figure and ground/horizon - point of reference and point of focus - drill and learning.

How could Bx nest in Bj? It couldn't since (or it's trivial that it does...) $Bj^{i}(1)$ has no set conditions save for Ii(1) ... otherwise it's Ii(Bx, 1), etc.

$$Bj^{i} \quad \underbrace{A(\ldots M\ldots)}_{Bx^{i}(1)} \quad \underbrace{B(\ldots M\ldots)}_{Bx^{i}(2)} \quad \underbrace{C(\ldots M\ldots)}_{\text{etc.}} \longrightarrow$$

If M $\{A, B, C, \text{etc.}\}$ is a natural series $\not\rightarrow$ 1, 2, 3, etc.

$Bj\,\{Bx^{Ii}(1) \neq Bx^{Ii}(2) \neq (3), \text{ etc.}\}$ or
$Bj\,\{(Bx^{i}(1) \neq \text{etc.}) \in I\}$

But 'A(...M...)B' as a brainstorm proposal?

Nesting might take place along the Bj axis to provide a Bx wave ... 'MA, MMB...'? (MA(MA, MB)(MA, MB, MC)).

But this nesting can only be truly transformational, i.e. unrecognizable and unknown/unmappable, unless any conversation was, roughly, something like : "'surf' "'surf' 'surf'"", etc.

Bj as vector, but without magnitude; not even the kinematics of a rigid body (structure); just the M of an -emics? Graphics is a fragment of that problem. But you can just tell someone that Bj is an unbounded field even when it's $\in$Ii. But that's making vectoral assumptions about the Bj mapping. Not quite, since it might be 'frozen' outside any lattice for Bx, and beyond the reach of any neighbouring Bj.

The 'disjunctioning' (of the 'surface') for Bj is 'Bj(1) $\neq$ Bj(2)' - and as the field is 'n-dimensional', then 'Bj(1) = Bj(2)' will have to be rewritten in scalar form/'structure'.

N.B. if $Bj(1)^{a} \neq Bj(2)^{a}$, then set conditions aren't just surface, i.e. if a = a list to be run up for all rational/cardinal continuum, (1) a = U for all i's in I; and that's a funny way of going about constructing a pragmatics.

And for any ordinal 'series', $a = -M$ of $(1)^{a}$ for any $i = (1)^{a}$ for any other i: $Bj(1) \neq Bj_{t}(i)$.

And you can't say that $\mathrm{Bj}^{\mathrm{Ii}}(1)$ is an open set, or rather a member of an open set which has only one member - re rules of congruence. (But it has at least more than one member.) Magnitude is then encapsulated in Bx prima facie mappings and dialogical strengths. The set Bx-ing is an historical continuum of an ordinal series where each ordinality is '$(x)\mathrm{Bj}^{\mathrm{Ii}}$'. That's back to Bj = M of Bx: the latter can describe a wave and the conditions for the vectoral 'pattern' and M dynamics for that wave - a clustered, open/but (naturally) numbered/historical Bj's.

For set Bj it has no, can have no, sense save as an historically (pseudo-) ordered point of reference in a dialogical set.

'Learning' as a Bj function on an n-series (Bx-ing=wff I) - (as still asking the question) not a mapping? a) There's no qualitative/scalar difficulty in embedding x and y. b) But without direction?

Bj's aren't in any set ... There can't be any series except in a natural sense as an uninterpretable string. A series has direction anyway. '1(Bj)2(Bj)3...etc.', 'Bx1(Bj)Bx2(Bj)Bx3...etc.' But if every function-modality of any point of reference contains all the functions of every other point of reference and can generate them Turing-style then '1(Bj)2(Bj...' isn't a series ⟶ and whither $\mathrm{Bx}^{\mathrm{Bj}}$? Unless it's $\mathrm{Bx1}^{\mathrm{Bx2}}$, etc., etc....

But (...A...) and (...B...) $\in \emptyset$, i where $\emptyset$ i = what?, where?, when?, etc.; in brackets?

Inter-set Bj1 = Bj2? Only to the 'natural ontic elements'. Or this identity is of a non-finite possibility of the possibilia of experience, i.e. a finite fragment of the immanent n-indexing which is not (merely) transformational to any part of discourse, i.e. the generating aesthetic.

R1. $\mathrm{Bx}^{\mathrm{Ii}}(1) = \mathrm{Bx}^{\mathrm{Ii}}(2) : \mathrm{Bj}^{\mathrm{Ii}}(1) \neq \mathrm{Bj}^{\mathrm{Ii}}(2)$ for closed and wff sets, $\in$ U, interpretation: a grammar.

R2. Iterations of I's (α, β, γ, δ, etc.). Anti-anaphor/surface trap: $\mathrm{Bx}^{\mathrm{Ii}}(1)^{\alpha} \neq \mathrm{Bx}^{\mathrm{Ii}}(1)^{\beta}$

R3. Rewriting: $\mathrm{Bx}^{\mathrm{Ii}}(1)^{\alpha} = \mathrm{Bx}^{\mathrm{Ii}}(2)^{\alpha}$
$\mathrm{Bx}(1)^{\alpha} = /{>}\mathrm{By}(2)^{\alpha}$

But - there is M of Bx-tactics from the margin of Bj - wave mechanics.

$Bj(1)^{\alpha} \neq Bj(1)^{\beta}$ intra/sub-set ... neighbouring $Bj(1)^{\gamma}$ etc.

Focus on Bj^{i} with (simply?) 'repeating' 'going-on', the blurt and drawing the quasi-continuum/life-restrictions '< >' - what would you get? Only an iterated range of series dependent upon the-defeasible-conditions-of-that-range. Anyway, since its character is 'revisionary', you can't map it, only experience it ... unless 'some α's are β's'. But consider '(...)' in (...A) as conditions for a mapping, outside iterated, 'closed' and open sets. It's not:



or Bj (1, 2; 1, 2, 3; ...etc.)C.



$Bx^{Ii}(1) < Bj^{Ii}(\ldots 1^{\alpha})$ = Bxal By Cal e (grammar),
e = $\{$Bj CBK$\}$ $\in$ revision_i.
But - revision_i is of M of $Bx^{Ii}(1) \neq Bx^{Ij}(1)$, not of $Bj^{Ij}(\ldots 1)$.

R4. An infinite set with no recursively countable set with immune complement is said to be simple (i.e. we might - naturally - be able to deal with it).

R5. Immune sets aren't productive (as mapping), i.e. immune = n + 1 (plus nj but going-on).

R6. Hence $Bj(\ldots X\ldots) \longrightarrow (Bx^{i})$ = creative sets. But we're not dealing with a 'consistent theory', but of finite length - No! - but consistent because of infinity and therefore immune from (sets and subsets = defence).

R7. A $\leq$ B if A is recursive in B, i.e. if therefore that's not just A $\in$ B? A trivial function $C_A(x)$ vanishes if and only if $x \in A$, then generated from $C_B(x)$.

Bx $\leqq$ Bj $\longrightarrow$ however for any Bx-ing.
Bx $\leqq$ Bj: but $C_A(x)$ depends upon a chain strength between A and B.

$Bx^i(1) = Bx^i(2)$; but $(Bx^i(1))^{Bj} \neq (Bx^i(2))^{Bk}$.

Answering a question satisfactorily isn't stopping the dialogue ... or hiatus ... rather than M of immune set-theoretical conditions for treating Bx By Cal, i.e. the old model of Bx is satisfied if and only if By lets him/it =

$\{M(x = y)^i\}^{Bj^i} \;/ = (x^i \in y^i) \neq (x = y)^i$ and not $xy \in I$.

$\{Bj\ (\ldots Bx \ldots)^i\} \neq \{Bk\ (\ldots By \ldots)^i\}$ hiatus - sickness

$Bj\ (\ldots Bx \ldots)^i = Bk\ (\ldots By \ldots)^i$ ennui - death

'Revision' is scalar, R to I.

Revision/Bj is immune to any of its subsets. So that the 'whole' of the 'reflexive, non-specific pragmatics' has any fragment that is R to Bj? Bj, Bk is not productive complementarity - is not regenerating the (depth→M of surface).

Revision/Bj is (perhaps) a classically 'simple set', although Bj might be transformed into a productive non-finite string - into Bx - which is not a non-finite string.

$\{1 \text{ ———————— } N\}\ I \neq \{1 \text{ ———————— } N\}\ Bj$

But $Bx \leqq Bj$ if any function/modality of Bx can be generated from Bj ... $(Bx)^{Bji}$, Bj is not recursively countable - 'simple'; Bx is our weakness for dialogical satisfaction - if it weren't that, Bx would be ennui. Anyway, Bx is immediate erotetic satisfaction, which is as absurd as stopping the conversation.

Immunity $\neq$ (Productive mapping, i.e. a continuum). Its only spectre is the 'triviality' of extrapolating - from the nesting - the continuum.

$Bj \longleftarrow Bx^i$?

Ask questions about Bx and - christologically - you get a partial mapping of Bj - (U1... (U2... (U3...))), etc. only if Bj was a generative quasi-base.

Continuity of non-iteratable (pragmatic) set Bj - as exhaustively immune from Bk - is either an iteration of the set-conditions of Bj's, Bk's strength or ironically their completeness.

a) $Bj = Bx^{i}$

$= Bx^{ii}$

= etc.

b) $Bj = MBx^{i}$

c) $MBj = Bx^{i}$ (a truism)

d) $MBj = MBx^{i}$; $MBj = MMBx^{i}$

The ontological problem: if Bj accelerates from Bx, then the ontological/methodological problems that accrue from Bx-ing, are articulated as:

$\exists(Bx) \in$ all M's of $(\exists x)$.

But that's not a different type-ing between Bx and Bj.

Ontological problems of the margin → perhaps like this ...

An event 'X'; lived through X_iM^{*} → and mapped Bxal;

$Bxal \neq X_iM / \neq$ 'X'

'X' does not accelerate away from Bxal.

$X_iM = Bj >$ 'X' $\not\rightarrow$ Bx

And it's not Bj(...Bx...) is it?

No? Well, because of the algebraic possibilities of Bj - they can in no way be brought out of the plane of Bx.

N.B. vector without magnitudes, e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4... is not a continuum unless 1(→) 2(→) 3(→) etc.... where '(→)' is common to all numbers. That's an ontological problem ... if (→) is common to all, i.e. common to a set ... Anselm: there's no difference between 1, 2, 3, and 4, etc. ... if 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. belong to a set (counting numbers). There's no scale, magnitude without M vector.

N.B. $\underline{(\ldots3\ldots)}$

'3' = an historical point of reference; but the vectors' values for '1', '2', etc. are not identical, save at L.C.D.'s.

That's an historical problem of arithmetic ... It's also a problem of varying and grouping modalities/arguments. For example, M1 → M2 → M3 approaches a grammar /epistemological plane which it can describe ... reflexively and elliptically.

$M1 \longrightarrow M2 \longrightarrow M3$ must (?) be in some relation to the reiteration of that continuum.

There is a relation between M1 and M2 other than concatenation. O.K., there's no hierarchy between M1 and M2 in a set (...M1 and M2 and...), but between $(M1)_1$ and $(M2)_2$.

Hierarchy can be as simple-minded as $(M1)_1 \longrightarrow (M2)_2$, etc. etc.

Back to a series, 1, 2, 3, etc.

("'Resignation'$_{M1}$, 'String'$_{M2}$, 'Drill'$_{M3}$")i

("'Ideology'$_{M1}$, 'Slogan'$_{M2}$, 'Dead Parrot'$_{M3}$")k

a) $(M1 \longrightarrow M2 \longrightarrow M3\ldots)i$
b) $(M1, 2, 3)i \longrightarrow (M1, 2, 3)k$
c) $(M1)i \longrightarrow (M1)k \longrightarrow (M2)i \longrightarrow (M2)k$

a) Intra-set relations as a problem of continuity.
b) Inter-set continuity problem.
c) Inter and intra-set continuity and possibility of a 'grammar'.

Continuity and 'margins': if the margin is only an arbitary (pragmatic) finite limit of the soul contents, then continuing the modalities of the soul is non-problematic; and the relationship between the modalities is non-problematic ... rather than recognizing the ontological bifurcation between margin and existence, i.e. (M1...M2...M3...)i, i.e. $Bj \neq (Bx + N\ldots+\ldots)$ and $Bx^{Bj} \neq Bj$ as a parameter/discrete edge, although it is a function.

'Negative Feedback'

Margin $\longrightarrow\longleftarrow$ (Extra-) Soul Contents
\ /
The Product — The Function of the Topology...
Topological
Structure is Ontological

Continuity/Going-on ... and change ...

The constructivistic root leads us to rational numbers = natural numbers = real numbers ... all counting is non-different:

[1, 1(2), 1,2(3), 1,2,3(4), etc.]

Otherwise we do face the Zeno paradox with a 'rational change of belief'→ (non-Bayesian, non-utility learning) →
a) We'd have, in changing from Bap → Baq, p as non-rational and q as rational. Why was p = rational? Why is q rational?
b) How does a rational change take place if p^R and q^R and $\sim(p \text{ and } q)^R$?
c) Zeno: $p^{R1} \ldots q^{R2}$ and R1 → R2 or 'R1 and R2' along with Rn and R2 so that $p^{R1} \ldots p^{Rn} \ldots p^{R2}$. Don't bother with p's and q's - it's not propositional ... so change is not diachronic.
d) Change as revision (complete (= all the M's of R1 are members of a set R2 with or without the a priori weights attached - at least they are 'described' - taken care of - iterated - in R2)).
e) 'Rational change' would be the grammatical in the Bxal sense, i.e. it would be a state description of what happened when 'R1 → R2' / 'R1 and R2' was suspended in its own incomplete M's (although 'R1 and R2' might be complete?), i.e. the rational change is the M's of change in a continuum 'R1, R2', not from R1 to R2 / R1 → R2!!

Therefore, M '$R^{\alpha} \longrightarrow R^{\phi}$' is a rational change ... 'it depends how low we stoop for our rationality conditions.'

N.B. 'Bxal By Cal' is, as a rational change, incomplete because of the M's of interpreting the state descriptions, and that equals M's of Bj ... Therefore, we must discuss rational change - it's just an index of Bj.

Change and Dialectic

Hegel - Natural Discourse - Synthesis - Naturlogik ... But the Reich des Sollens - Sickness unto Death - The Absolute Final Conclusion - i.e. the total and finite solution of Hegel's logic - what arises from Hegelianism is a peculiar type of problematic.

And but again → absolute idealism (etc.) as ideology as a weapon. (O.K., bring in Bayesian utility there ...).

Bj > the Reich des Sollens - Hegelian disjunction. Change is chronic not diachronic ... and wff (as nature).

1(...M...), 2(...M...), etc. plus '$1(\ldots M \ldots)^i$, $\ldots 2(\ldots M \ldots)^j$ ...etc. "hiatus point" ...3(...M...), etc.' as wff, i.e. 'going-on from memory', 'where we left off last week'.

But '$(1, 2, 3\ldots)^{Bxal^{Bj}}$' is not a hiatus point. Except for Bx ... for Bj it's finished ... and wff complete.

A series of NN = a M (set of) state description(s) which 'X' is unable to understand as coherent: this is a lattice-mapping remark... it's coherent as a series, but not as a congruency to 'Y's' series.

$\{ 1, 2, 3 \}Y$
$\{ 1\ldots 2\ldots 3\ldots\text{etc.} \}X$

(Rules of congruency, M of a critique of a NN series.)

Learning?

'Escaping from uncertainty' vis-a-vis NN series as 'iterated rational strings'?

M of learning as pattern recognition, i.e. Bx-ing towards a partial grammar of a function ... given that as learning with a Bayesian utility principle(s) - N.B. Harold's retrospective 'rejectamenta'. ... How the Bx-ing could treat it (modalize it) would thus be a function (trivially) of how the 'rejectamenta' (anything Bx-ed) be 'seen'.

...But how does anything Bx-ed get seen/viewed in relation to Bj's? Could be 'Bj and Bx' (as the margin capturing the soul - an absurdity as a subset, but an implication of the Quineian, Draconian ontology).

Therefore determinism and anti-determinism?

The intractability of vectors comes from the absurdities (involved only in the nexus of phenomenologies dealing with data) of characterizing the kinematics of a rigid body with the inertia (modalities) of a system of (linguistic/'concrete'?) particles.

Ontological fast-breeding of i's is not a problem - escaping from vicious localization of i's (as an approximate of an epistemological situation) which may (?) catch up with localized ellipticality ... which may be the problem to approach apropos the (any) ontological intractability.

That is, set inclusion, with, at best, a list of modalities (without priority).

Would the following Bx/Bj provide no complexities of an aggregating Bj set - i.e. forgetting/memory?

Bj has to be left blank. For all Bx-ing, Bj has to be left blank with MMBx-ing, otherwise it's only Bx-ing. And 'Bj-ing' is not regression ... it's just a name??

AL and me... What I know, care about... Going-on as Grammar,
No money, no prospects... Fear... Starvation...

From ideology (range of ideas... intuitions of necessity) let us forget about ontology. Using our discourse to test our ideology as a possibility, deal with the notion of going-on as an important principle... the pivot of dialectics. Commitment: why commitment? This is no simple task .. A theory of learning and a theory of culture.

Bxal maps onto a sample - it says 'how' indexing takes place (and where). But dialogue seems to be no more than a point of reference in respect of going-on... It's determined as 'operations', it's a set of instructions, etc.

We have to introduce a few new ideas: how to specify a point of reference... These notes at best form a pathway for people prepared to walk.

We can't tell a group from other things half the time. Every time we set something up, decidability becomes an issue.

Any fool can say that his discourse is the mirror of his mind.

We can say that 'al' is more absolute than 'It's a nice day'... 'al' is a type, an unspecified pragmatic parameter. Something's marked-off in some way. An item's been held-up for scrutiny ... somehow.

'al' means 'subjective' doesn't it? 'It's a nice day' mapped-back to going-on if we really did have an index... But you can go-on in less official circumstances.

Now one of our problems is the generalization of going-on (Cal). It may involve a bit more than a map of 'commitment'. Perhaps 'concatenation' needs to be de-atomized from 'I'll go-on'... Does that mean 'I (you, etc.) index "..."'? How might it do that?... We need to abandon 'al' in the notation.

O Bxal S is a function... But we are not dealing with Bxal computability - so why change Bxal at-all? The whole problem is mooted in respect of (a) the problem of identity-chasing, and (b) the problem of identity chasing as sorting-out combatant particles.

Bxal: we might regard Bx as a production of index signal... we can say when it seems to occur - a case of blurting.

Consider the possibility of treating any point of reference just like a Bx... Anyway, we are going to have a problem of 'logical location'.

Bx(al): an index index...

Bxal says that within a modal context going-on may be indicated... not as a smart notion... This is a learning transaction. You can 'expand' going-on - and going-on is an ideological position. It could be said that Bxal conditions the state of the dialogical 'slate'... the prospect of commitment. Bxal as a system of some kind in the context of the assembly of an anthropocentric diagram.

Terry is a member B of AL... He has two slots B1 and B2 - one is labelled 'input', the other 'output'... how disastrous. al is a point of reference for B, and B(x) is a point of reference for going-on... it's an object... (Not one of contemplation however). What sort of reference might Bxal have? It's a means of confronting a case or cases of going-on.

The logic of power... how do we deal with the problem of congruence here? A form of -emics: the set Bxal... is -emics here perhaps... And there is a bond between -emics and ...ethics.

Bx as indicator of the start of a continuum... Bx By, rather... but how do we get distinctive components... to form a structure? We might consider 'proposition' and 'form'... the former being 'function' in the complex of which a blurt(?) is a part. The inventory of -emes ... The prospect of discrete units...

al al al
0 1 2
Time →

AL (al) insertions are resonant... and we are committed to them. We might 'describe' a Bx... selection in terms of something analogous to 'form' and 'property'.

Bxal..., HBxal..., AL, etc... A transfer of energy back and forth, in a sense that has to exclude pendulums... as semantically significant.

We might consider an adaption of the (now redundant) pre-Ramsey notion of 'degrees'... Take al_0, al_1, al_2, etc. as naturals and then proceed by set telescoping.

Start-off one day with al in Bxal By Cal, Bxal(n) By Cal(n)...and you would never see it again... or anything like it again...Dedekindian sections?

Bxal as an ideal conatus covering going-on... without any clever or philosophical stuff. It's mostly a question of how some of our very strong modalities find an existence in the context of the aims we have... which are the sorts of aims you get embarassed hearing about... when people ask you questions where else they can (could) find-out about them. But it has got to be simpler... We are put somewhere by various non-logical reverberations. And the prospect of seeing our situation as problematic depends on a different erotetic environment's being accessible. We can't abandon the al.

We'll use capitals when the index isn't tied to Bx:

AL_1 AL_2
R

AL_1 JA_1

With respect to an entirely concatenatory development, a synchronic ordering is pre-ordering,

i.e. AL_1, etc. ... Time (Density (?))
This is non-linear... Someone might sort it out.

$Bxal_1$ By Cal_2 | $Bxal_R$ By Cal_R

'Functional properties' are the issue at the moment.

What would we do with a triple, quadruple, etc?

Infinity hybridity: can we have a problem of proliferation? Is that a form of resonance between points of reference? Neighbouring ones must depend on an F- P resonance.

$Bxal_1$ By Cal_2 : some difference has to be a resonance... and a concatenation might be able to proceed in an analogous fashion... to syntax/syntagmatics, etc.

Modes typical of comic continua: R through the specious continuum(?).

... At least two points of reference... don't have to be under simultaneous scrutiny... In respect of a whole, the 'how' may be a real problem.

AL, al: can they ever be theirs... (cf. naughty dialectical posters). (Substitute 'soul-marginal' for 'theirs'.)

So AL's, al's, $AL_{(n)}$'s, $al_{(n)}$'s are neighbouring because they exist in resonant situations. But we are not saying that we are just dealing with pragmatic parameters... whatever they are. The AL, etc. positions are discrete (psychologically) only in limited degrees; here's hoping that Russell's pre-Ramsey solution was only a piece of smart-ass mathematics.
Do we really want any more quasi-rigour?... Points of reference are indices of blurting and also indices of what we say is concatenation.

A 'Theirs' index might make a difference to Bxal... and remain entirely parasitic on Bxal... selections. Bxal is either the same/ or not - i.e. is synchronic in some way? This is just -tactics.

The first relation is ... we postulate a 'possible' resonance ...
$\underline{\text{al} \mid \text{JA}}$

If al then JA (somewhere?) - i.e. there is factually a case in which there is a non-al index for this expression ... al is either transitive or not/and both (theirs/ours).

Now, al_2 exists in relation to 'I' al JA - iterated al can't be just trivial, it's the form of the hybrid. Now, we have to make hybridity for only a partial hybridity notion. This is feasible, but we need selection criteria. Our intuitions, or what? Or is 'index al' 'Bxal By Cal' then worked out?

Componential features - AL has certain componential features; a point of reference is something with componential features. Or is it (like 'time') just a category? But, it must depend upon ... cognizance thereof ... But points of reference are in some ways attached to (better than) 'open' intervals.

Time $T^1 \longrightarrow T^2$ ... i.e. a neighbourhood - or interspace transformation - and intraspace transformations of JA - on-off - i.e. plus or minus, etc. of the early items; Documenta - but al is not 'subject-uniform' - subject-uniformity might be simpler than something that is easily understood as algebraic.

There's a problem of functional signals - but what exists in relations expands the universe and resonates. al JA al: constant-pairs as 'incompletes' or resonances - choose any - except al JA non-iterated. The resonance is dependent upon phase. Either the universe expands - qua sames or qua non-sames - or al or n al, i.e. JA or cognates. But how are they dealt with?

Pertinent features: do we need a quadruple?

Bx	S	ed	ia
Bx	D	es	ia

Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By Cal
Bxal (JA)	By Cal (JA)	Bxal (JA)	By Cal (JA)

Points of reference - important with resonances there somewhere:

$\text{Bxal}_{\text{F(orm)}}$ By Cal = 'F' S or $\neq$ s

Bxal (JA) -

Bx (JA) By C (JA) - (first congruence rule) and we can drop the brackets.

For Bx JA $\neq$ Bxal. However, JA and al are capable of further resonance.

Bxal JA : al_1 (more: 'that' slate) i.e. a dialogical strength here - we have a resonance - same in respect of Bx, but different in respect of entry ... That won't do.

Analogue for F(orm) and P(roperty):

$al + JA = al_1$, $al_1 \neq JA$, $al = al$

$al_1\{al\ JA\ Bxal \neq Bxal\ JA\}al$, and

Bxal JA   Bxal JA al   Cal al

Bx + Cal   Bxal JA

F + P Bx + C

Bxal Cal

Bxal JA al Cal JA

Bxal, it can't just be 'S' or 'n S' - it's far too trivial.

Bxal   Cal / Bxal JA al Cal al, or

Bxal JA   Cal JA ...

Indeterminacy - amounting to 'alternative' futures: Bxal 

al_1 al_2 / 'more than' al_1 - i.e. gives al_1 - but that can't be dependent on Bxal selection (unless redundant).

Expand the region 'relative to these possibilities':

al   al   al   al   al
  JA

Consider an intuitive and unexplained notion - like a case of 'learning' or of learning to concatenate.

Expand relative to 'C' also - pathway to a problem: 'Bx', etc. is a relation.

Anthropological map or margin?



Bx By Cal → 'Dialectic' - loaded or not - towards an 'understanding' of structure.

An intensional point of reference is less 'comparable' than others.

In respect of P or F ... state - degree about Al JA - 'less' or 'more' compatibility ... JA ← or → al.

Cal stays the same (?) and an increment of 'weight' ensues.

Also, isn't this a 'theirs'/'ours' problem?

R between al and JA. There is a relation between al : JA:

al JA : al same ('R') intensification - we still need a quadruple.

Take al as point of reference margin - the item might be a lattice. We might have an even more anthropomorphic diagram. Limit on an anthropomorphic diagram or an exemplary anthropomorphic diagram ...

al is a partial margin; JA is a place-holder for 'unknown' (noumenal) point of reference R between Bx and C: S (L)
S (E) (?)

Formal Status and Functional Property: We might find an adequate analogue in relation to differences between points of reference. Consider what it might be to be formally 'other' (unspecific) - 'imagination of "otherness"' ... and functional property ... to be 'that sort of point of reference'. Map that back to margin: 'M'.

al JA : for 'mal': a time - known, but hypothesized structural relation. Property function in string? No analogue so far. Point of reference, soul contents. Dialectical marginality or ...

$$\left.\begin{array}{l}\text{Extensional properties}\\ \text{Intensional properties}\end{array}\right\}\quad \text{This needs airing in another development.}$$

Factual/subjective - what I feel and didn't tell connotes a different line... Or merely resonant in respect of one component ... al JA ... surface resonance? al R al JA (or etc.) 'concentrated weight' on a region of al ... whatever that might be. Same in respect of selection or Cal ... what could that tell us? Cal index, or not? Expanded JA takes Cal toward JA. So specificity would fuck us up here. I could try a self-portrait. But isomorphism here would need an intensional logic.

Look up a partial-usable of such an intensionalism. Blurt - validity - we want a mapping of mapped-blurting onto going-on. Or, a point of reference of the religious community. A model won't do - -emics precedes -tactics in this area du monde ... -emics = or > -ethics?

$$\begin{array}{l|l} \text{Bx} & \text{Cal} \\ \hline \text{H Bxal JA} & \text{Cal} \vdash \end{array}$$

Assume that blurting always would have a resonance with C.

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{Bxal JA} & \equiv & \text{Cal JA} \\ \text{Bxal JA : al} & & \text{Cal JA : JA} \\ & \vee & \\ \text{Bxal JA : al} & & \text{Cal : al} \\ \text{Bxal} \ldots & \equiv & \ldots \text{ al} \\ \text{Bx} \ldots \text{ al} & & \end{array}$$

explicit relations

But that is too strong and too arbitrary - relative or not (i.e. al unknown, unsuspected - starts from somewhere)...

Vector and Magnitude

Modalities don't have to equal a type and tokening of motivational (what?) ontological attitudes to aspire to conditions of a Bj1 set. 'Any modality' is not vectoral, but i-ed, a magnitude ... on what scale? Is it a non-logical problem? That is, because of the divergence of future inputs to the dialogical situation(s), there can't be an influence function mapped for the inductive-credence-gut-reactions for the next datum. No! A) 'the next datum'? B) 'next i' as counterfactual. C) 'information' as non-depth? Or as reflexive plus influential ('exhaustively')!

Vectors as the grounds of consistency of the Bx-ing set ... i.e. = scale. But unless Bx's i's are the exhaustive M's of Bj, then is it a passion for > intersubjectivity? (That's ludicrous inasmuch as we (Cal) have it - non-difference.)

This is a result of ($\exists$x) uniqueness plus - or rather - M revision-transformation of i's $\in$ J: this is the intractability of the mapping situation; Mr-t is a function of any magnitude (Bx-ing). The set J can't itself be revised... but, again, Bx i's aren't (in a dialectical way (?)) revised if there's a continuum (= any modalities!) of Bx i's by simply Bx-ing.

1 A rough guide:

M = 'Possibly', Bx = 'A closed set', Bj = 'An iterated (open)
('function') set'...

But read this through and try to invoke other available rules.

Uplifting Public Utterance

This is all about the Bxal business and related activities, parables, etc.

How is it possible to be clear, when the problem of the erotetic (questioning) framework is such as to inhibit the express formulation of 'our' problems? ... We are looking for the conditions of problems ... questions. Why Bxal and all that? We assume that intra-Al space dialogue possibilities are not that simple ... Copernicanism versus a black-hole?

There's the problem that 'going-on' (concatenation is a partial formalism of this) is what pervades our experience from the inside ... It might also be said to be the only rigorously accessible principle of any culture (learning). How would you map determinism in your life with that thought in mind?

The Bxal (etc.) situation is a friendlier climate than other schemata can be ... 'Experience' (i.e. that which linguists call 'mere', try to iron-out, etc.) doesn't have to come to terms with the CO_2 atmosphere of other schemata (in use, or putatively use/mention). It (or rather its permitted-operations-specification) is amenable to the absorption and also the capturing of that experience's discontinuity together with requisite formalizing continuity.

Bxal can catch a lot ... The limit is expressible, not expressed - it can't specify one idiolect or language. What it can do is remind one of certain global conditions of any 'communication'. This prima facie involves the revision of ideology, e.g. in no circumstances is discourse (communication) semantically neutral, in fact it's not semantic (cf. para. 2). Academic logic is just the quack proprietory medicine - a reliever of recurring symptoms.

We, in manipulating Bxal, and each other (in the AL asylum), are merely suggesting what it might be like to have any index ... which is not an object of contemplation. Pace Lukacs, 'the icy finality of criticism in the dialectic is only the margin of (our) index (soul) contents.'

Bxal Q.E.D.

Whether there exists, or has existed an 'ideological' person (an ideological/problematical person)...whether all are... or no-one there is no prospect of deciding. There is no proposal that the issue be decided...but we must be permitted to sit here and consider the (defeasible) conditions of an ideology - how such an 'ideologue' might conduct his dialogue/ activity...life...without in a speculative fashion committing ourselves to the paralogism of inferring an object of contemplation from sets of postulates much less concluding from our hypothetical thinking that it's ourselves as a well-formed set...by virtue of the alleged identity of congnition and the prospect of quantifying.

...Anyway, what we do is not so personal or anthropological as to say (to) of anyone that he is an ideological (religious?) person...neither do we deny (to) of anyone that he is ideological. We establish the possibility that everyone can have ideology... confront an index/indices - with the exception of those who simply can't be afflicted.

How else can we be suggesting a learning/teaching in respect of the unsaid?... The bedlam (pandemonium) of the said must constitute the sets of points of reference of the unsaid.

Fragment from Contemporanea Index

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Dear . . .

(1) The following short (and inconclusive) notes may be of some help in dealing with the problems of interpretation which are felt to accrue to some of our recent activity. (There is a prospect of resolving some of these whether they may be thought to flow from the socio-epistemological vacuum which was generated by our (partial) reservations concerning the journal Art-Language - and about linguistic/semantic normal form in general: we are carrying-on a form of the 'journal' as an extensive 'proceedings'.)

(2) It is worth pointing-out that a number of our present concerns and instruments are of vastly greater generality than those developed in the past. A consequence of this greater scope is that we are dealing with items of a more provisional and problematical character.

(3) Some points about the 'concatenation' (Bxal By Cal') problems as exemplified in our shows in Zurich (June), Turin/Rome (October), London (October) and New York (December).

(a) How is it possible to be clear, when the problem of the erotetic (questioning) framework is such as to inhibit the express formulation of 'our' problems?... We are looking for the conditions of problems ...questions. Why Bxal and all that? We assume that intra-AL space dialogue possibilities are not that simple...Copernicanism versus a black-hole? This is a problem of recursion - asking questions about the conditions of questions.

(b) 'Ideology' is a problematic notion which covers such ideas as the points of reference of the relations between one's intuitions of necessity (partially, commitments) and the range of ideas. These intuitions may be represented as indices of dialectical tableaux. An exemplary situation might be one in which someone asks who?...what?...why? where?...with whom?...in relation to what?...etc.

(c) There's the problem that 'going-on' (concatenation is a partial formalism of this) is what pervades our experience from the inside... It might also be said to be the only rigourously accessible principle of any culture (learning). How would you map determinism in your life with that thought in mind?

(d) The Bxal (etc.) situation is a friendlier climate than other schemata can be... 'Experience' (i.e. that which liguists call 'mere', try to iron-out, etc.) doesn't have to come to terms with the CO_2 atmosphere of other schemata (in use, or putatively use/mention). It (or rather its permitted-operations-specification) is amenable to the absorption and also the capturing of that experience's discontinuity together with requisite formalizing continuity.

(e) Bxal can catch a lot...The limit is expressible, not expressed - it can't specify one idiolect or language. What it can do is remind one of certain global contions of any 'communication'. This prima facie involves the revision of ideology, e.g. in no circumstances is discourse (communication) semantically neutral, in fact it can't be sorted out in terms of standard semantics (cf. para. (c)). Academic logic is just the quack proprietory medicine - a reliever of recurring symptons.

(f) We, in manipulating Bxal (concatenation), and each other (in the AL asylum), are merely suggesting what it might be like to have any index ...which is not an object of contemplation. Pace Lukacs, 'The icy finality of criticism in the dialectic is only the margin of (our) index (soul) contents.' Obviously our work is not on the periphery of our experience... people tend to forget this.

(g) Concatenation (etc.) Q.E.D.

Points of Reference, the Hope of Ideology

Moore's and Anderson's approach'[1] is only partially useful. The learning problem does not satisfy our problem of ideology: if we are committed to their idea of 'learning' ⟶ culture, the question whether ideology might lie (behind) their notion, or in it, emerges. Ideology(ies) will also be abstract ... wherewith Occam's razor? Are we going to regard ideology as something like conditions of culture? ... Or ... the conditions of appearance ... emergence of cultural objects? We can assume we can 'witness' learning ... taking place ... we have to regard ideology as something like learning-tradition-conditions. Can we extend Moore and Anderson? Or ... can we say that ideology is the condition(s) of a cultural object's constituting a going-on ... a concatenation in (our) not Levi Strauss' sense? No 'research project' as such would begin to determine any kind of approach. We can't provide adaptions of critical formal considerations, considerations of pairs, rules for going-on - given learning... Consideration of going-on as a form of 'diffusion' ... at least of learning/reading, is outside the rational net ... only as a reminding (cf. the relation of threshold syntax and any reworked piece of Kierkegaardianism). The funny thing is that our reconstructive ceteris paribus is Hegelian insofar as it espouses a programme of rational satisfaction(ism).

So we take a piece of discourse/activity and modality as something like an ideo-object which belongs to the class $\Delta\,(\exists x)\,(\exists y)\,(x \neq y)$ and $\Diamond^{2}$ (x learns Δ from y) and these are all conceptual objects.

$$\Delta \text{ is such that } \widehat{\text{go}}\,(\exists\Delta^{\partial})\,(\exists\Delta^{2}),\ \text{`}B\Delta^{\partial}\,B\Delta^{2}\widehat{\text{go}}_{(\text{Ind})}.\text{'}\left(\ \{[\Delta]\} \in \{\Delta\}\ \ldots\right)$$

Ind limit of A = def $\hat{\Delta}\,(\exists x)\,(\exists y)$ $[$x has A as point(s) of reference and $\Diamond$ (x learns Δ from y and $x \neq y$)$]$?

What about surprise? Revision of ideology would add ... another postualted entity - or do we just say something like '$\Delta^{\partial} \dashrightarrow \Delta^{2}$ does not have as its A (?) the rationality conditions of Cont (= def) $\hat{\Delta}\,(\exists x)\,(\exists y)$ $[$x learns Δ from y and $x \neq y]$... $B\Delta^{\partial}\,B\Delta^{2}\,C_{(\Delta^{\partial} \rightarrow \Delta^{2})}$. $(C \approx \text{go})$' ?

So, wherewith our Barnet Newman's?

If you take a rude sample, you may get someone to see that the mystery of his capacity to read 'English' prose is often, or can be, a mask which obliterates the conditions in which (situation in which) he is participating. I suppose another condition on the above symbolism is that a species of self-consciousness be supposed - but only 'revision' is admitted by us ... or if you like 'ideology' - call the earlier type 'ideology (trap)'.

...Something clever like that. Now, how do we satisfy those conditions? Do we find a satisfactory point of reference for 'C' ((conc) ... 'go-on' ...) and do it? ...There are bound to be types of index ... whether complex or simplex we don't know.

Wherewith them and us?

$\Delta^{\partial} \dashrightarrow \Delta^{2}$ constitutes 'go-on' for both x and y ... is this just too academic, or particular?

We might be able to rewrite our original formulations. Ideology starts here -

An ideo/participatory object belongs to the class ... a class $\hat{\Pi}(\exists x)(\exists y)(x \neq y)$ and $\Diamond$ (x learns Π from y) -

better -

'$\Diamond(\exists x)(\exists y)(x \neq y)$'? (Re-form in them/us AL ...) We may not be up against it that much! And is such that $\widehat{go}\ (\exists\{[\Pi]\}^{2})$ $(\exists\{[\Pi]\}^{\partial})\ (\{[\Pi]\}, \{[\Pi]\} \in \{\Pi\}\ldots)$ [and $B\Pi^{\partial}B\Pi^{2}$(ind)] - namely that Π is a case of go, or what? Remember, for us '$\Pi^{\partial} \not\longrightarrow \Pi^{2}$'.

Should learning be replaced by 'blurts out to', or something pandemonic? Or is it the case that we've fired wide of the learning object?

Ideology is just exactly the failure to conform to the conditions of rationality. This may be come clearer, but a recycling of some of the variable so far churning is called for - prepare! - the second coming. Or could we say that hearing/reading, etc. is a funny subject of learning ... you can say that the rational reconstruction of it is 'hearing', but the ideological reconstruction is 'learning', or could be ... Learning, to which any linguistic surface can only make a partial (and structural) contribution ... the rest of the space is taken up by questions? So $\{\Pi\}$ is only really $\{[\Pi]\} \longleftarrow CM^{3} \longrightarrow \{[\Pi \cdots]\}$.

So, can we have L-functions (learning-functions) (and these are special) as expressed in respect of inter-space (set) modalities? Consider the set theory of contributing membership ... now what? We can postulate ideo/go-on expression 'sameness' for the membership. $\Pi^{\partial} - \Pi^{\zeta}$ are in relation to the same learning point of reference (function) - and that set can be closed. What the criteria of set closure might be, I don't know. Systematics? The 'A' type function might be another issue to consider in respect of learning-surface. If we postulate a set as closed, we postulate a set of learnables-cum-concatenata sharing the same functional property. Is the 'open' set perhaps one which defies $x \neq y$ (cf. us/them)?

I don't have much of a gestalt (at the moment) of the set theory and learning and individuation. (The state of the art might support my reticence.)

◇ learnable 'morph',
◇◇ learnable stem, i.e. -tactic string? Or open set sans systematic relation? Postulation as a result of ◇ L (+ iteration (perhaps))?

Are there just differently indeterminate learning situations expressed here? The point is that we never reach full systematic realization. This is presumably how the hybrid works. You can't consider the issue save in terms of these mesomerisms and quasi-mesomerisms: learning and the like.

Iteration can't be on learning - it must be expressed as soul-in-relation-to-the A, which can have some sort of definition.

Now, the closed-set members (they are a mystery) are regarded as contributors to the (same) learnability point of reference whose conceptual and psychological reality is finally tapered-out (is quasi-terminally expressed) in (as) a going-on relation ... of a non-contrastive type. Further points of reference are compresent as hybrid-forming items deriving from iterations of points of reference (A's) (... soul marginal tensors?).

So, are 'stems' one stage more looney? Obviously it is all looney. But it may be important to remember that a member of an 'open' set must be postulated when we are considering 'open' ones. It doesn't follow, however, that we are bound to quantify over the same... Consider the idea of go-on non-contrastiveness: such an idea would propose not a lot more than there is a way that two (or more) learnables (learners), if we consider learning (able) set memberships, will share a dynamic property. This is in respect of the 'open' if we postulate 'learning' as parasitic on a set of points of reference, and assume that there can be intra-world learnability...

Learnability across sets (morphic. L's (?)) ... that is to say, we add the condition -

$\left\{[\Pi^{\partial}], [\Pi^{2}]\right\} \mathrm{NC} \left\{[\Pi^{x}], [\Pi^{f}]\right\}$ (in respect of obvious analogues with Cologne notation). '$\left\{[\ldots] \quad [\ldots]\right\}$' = '$\left\{[\ldots]\right\}$' Cologne, i.e.

$\left\{\widehat{go}^{1} = \widehat{go}^{2}\right\}^{I}$ (etc.)

$\left\{\widehat{go}^{1} = \widehat{go}^{3}\right\}^{I^*}$ for all other set (inter-set) - although that's a soggy bit of notation. Still ... the point is that our 'A' thing is pretty important, save for our surprise quotient. The rest of it makes not much difference. 'Memberships', etc. seem to be in need of indices - these can be sorted.

Importantly, we want to consider 'outside', or absurd, or set theoretically complex learnables (both of these). (Cf. our posters, 'neither', etc. still have to be considered in the context of absurdity versus truism.)

'Across' set, i.e. learnability-index-inter-space operations, presumably postulate diffusion 'beyond' surface. Is it just hypothetical? Or is it learning where we can't sustain the issue of contributing membership? But 'any member(ship)' isn't involved in the way I keep drifting ... We are saying that 'L' helps us sort out 'Bxal', etc. - but not a lot more. The indices aren't brought out here.

Contrastive $\widehat{go}$ ratings might be though to deal with indices as they impinge on the possibility of learning. Do I have to leave the business fully unexplained? To do so will involve none of us in any solecisms. You get the idea you learn - the same way you go-on.

Any member of this (second-basic) learning set-go-on pair is contrastive with respect to any other.

I'm arguing that some learning situations do not involve 'divisible' wholes ... but presumably we have to reflect discontinuity somehow. Also, we are dealing with learnability contrast, ◇ ... etc. expressed (quasi-terminally) as some go relation. Ideology does not involve 'rational' concatenation. Is it possible to suggest that 'learning' in respect of the 'contrastive' mode is 'ideological'?

'Surf, surf, surf' is not child's play.

Notes -

1. O.K. Moore & A.R. Anderson, Toward a Formal Analysis of Cultural Objects, 1962.

2. = 'possibly'.

3. CM = 'is a contributing member of ... '

Where 'x' → 'shut' and 'y' → 'your mouth', read (1) 'Bxal By Cal' as "the blurting production of 'shut' as discourse indexed al blurtingly produces 'your mouth' as discourse indexed al ... and described as concatenation-functional - 'going-on' ... 'from ... to' ... in al".

From this, accept that it's natural to interpret (1) (malformed formula) as a statement to the effect that 'shut' is an (early) first place member of (this) Talking-to-each-other (go-on) relation, and 'your mouth' is a second (later) place member thereof. Sometimes we might want to call or think of later place members as 'transformation subjects' al.

There might be lots of ways to express a lot of this ... what are the advantages? We don't have the dictionary ... this is not rational ... it's what we might want though, isn't it?

So, down to the simple types - and drop a bit of overweight notation.

Accept (e. g.) that:

xal = 'shut'
y = 'your mouth'
Cal = 'going-on'

Df. 1)
Any set (?)

(xal, (y, Cal)) :	Bxal By Cal	is a going-on al relation of type (i)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	Bxal By n Cal	is ... etc. type (ii). (Think of 'n' as indicating 'failure' ... negation moderation.)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	n Bxal By n Cal	type (iii)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	n Bxal By Cal	type (iv)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	Bxal n By Cal	type (v)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	Bxal n By n Cal	type (vi)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	n Bxal n By Cal	type (vii)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	n Bxal n By n Cal	type (viii)

The simple types are too strong (and they're silly in application most of the time). Don't worry about why at the moment, but a fairly exhaustive characterization of ... going-on relations can be obtained from constellations of simple types, i.e. from the four schemata Bxal By Cal, Bxal By n Cal, (simplified to) Bx n By Cal, Bx n By n Cal, one can obtain 4^2 'basic types'.

Some of the constellations are sets which don't represent satisfiable formulae ... are we interested in satisfaction? There are other combinations: forget them. A-D 1-6 are sets which represent satisfiable formulae. A-D 7-16 are molecular (and) complex expressions capable of weakening 1-6 when concatenated therewith.

The application of a whole (four element) concatenation expression ('line') involves a structural (concatenatory) hybrid of degree 1. This indicates a mesomeric (type 1) 'directional' grammatical situation.

A*-D* 1-6 can express a degree of (hybrid) teleological 'influence' of a first place member in respect of a second place member.

A		B		C		D		
n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal	1
n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal	2
n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal	3
Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal	4
n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal	5
n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal	6
n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal	7
Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal	8
Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal	9
n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal	10
Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal	11
Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal	12
Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal	13
Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal	14
n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal	15
Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal	16

A*	B*	C*	D*	
n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	1
n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal	2
n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal	3
Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	4
n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	5
n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	6

'A'-'P' and 'Q'-'V' are substituted for '1'-'16' (A-D) and '1'-'6' (A*-D*) respectively. Variables j, k are introduced - ranging over items not regarded as candidates for concatenation. These are substituted for x and y where a non-blurt is indicated before the B in question: e.g. n Bxal n By Cal is 'n Bjal n Bk Cal'.

Surface features are regarded as 'ideologically' accessible only when embedded indivisibly in their 'index structure'. Bx . . . etc. selections are indexed to various modalities. Red, red, red and red, red, red, blue, blue, blue, etc. concatenatory items are regarded as contributing members of the closed sets to which they are indexed. M_1, M_2, etc. are the indices of members of open sets. Now consider T, TM, etc. . . .

Ia


Hello Terry...
How are you?
| |ca1| |
| |ca2| |
$| |\overset{\alpha}{mc}{}^{M_1}{}_1$
$| |\overset{\alpha}{mc}{}^{M_2}{}_1$
$| |\overset{\beta}{mc}{}^{M_1}{}_1$
$| |mmc^{M_{1*}}{}_1$
$| |mc^{M_1}{}_1$
$| |mc^{M_2}{}_1$

Ib


Hello Ian...
How are you?
| |cb1| |
| |cb2| |
$mmc^{M_{1*}}| |_2$
$| |\overset{\beta}{mc}{}^{M_2}{}_1$
$| |mmc^{M_{2*}}{}_1$
$mc^{M_1}| |_2$
$mc^{M_2}| |_2$

Ic


Hello...
etc.
$mmc^{M_{2*}}| |_2$

These are very imperfectly formed postulates - and the order/ontology isn't at all clear. It will be possible to consider it by 'working' the tableaux to some extent. Anyway, this may do as faintly mnemonic.

Think of the 'I's' as 'index + Bx selection + surface' in a sense, and leave some of the rules to sort it out. 'Bxs' = 'Bxal, etc. selection', etc.

For any Ca, Cb:

$$\mathrm{Bxs}^{\{Ia\}}\left\{c\right\} \neq \mathrm{Bxs}^{Ib}\left\{c\right\} \therefore$$

$$\mathrm{Bxs}\left\{\left[cal\right]\right\} \neq \mathrm{Bxs}\left\{\left[cb1\right]\right\}$$

N.B. ' c ' denotes the whole lot of concatenatory candidates.

$$\downarrow$$

$$\mathrm{Bxs}^{\{Ia\}}\left\{\left[cal\right]\right\} = \mathrm{Bxs}^{\{Ia\}}\left\{\left[ca2\right]\right\}$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$\mathrm{SBjs}^{\{Ia\}}\left\{c\right\} = \mathrm{Bjs}^{\{Ib\}}\left\{c\right\}$$

This is 'the whole set'.

$$\downarrow$$

$$\mathrm{Bjs}\left\{\left[ca1\right]\right\} = \mathrm{Bjs}\left\{\left[cb1\right]\right\}$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$\mathrm{Bjs}\left\{\left[ca1\right]\right\} \neq \mathrm{Bjs}\left\{\left[ca2\right]\right\}$$

This may be too strong - or 'rigorous' - expressing a relation where none exists.

$$\downarrow$$

$$\mathrm{Bjs}\left\{\left[ca1\right]\right\} \neq \mathrm{Bxs}\left\{\left[c^{M_{2*}}\right]\right\}$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$\mathrm{Bjs}\left\{\left[c^{M_{1*}}\right]\right\} = \mathrm{Bjs}\left\{\left[c^{M_{2*}}\right]\right\}$$

and

$$\downarrow$$

$$\mathrm{Bxs}\left\{\left[c^{M_{1}}\right]\right\} \neq \mathrm{Bxs}\left\{\left[c^{M_{2}}\right]\right\}$$

etc.

$$\text{Also, } T \equiv \left\{\left[mc^{M_{1_{1}}} + \ldots\right]\right\} \xrightarrow{\{Ia\}} \left\{\left[c^{T}{}_{1}\right]\right\}.$$

$$\left\{\left[mc^{M_{2_{1}}} + \ldots\right]\right\} \xrightarrow{\{Ia\}} \left\{\left[c^{T}{}_{2}\right]\right\}.$$

$$\mathrm{Bxs}\left\{\left[c^{T}{}_{1}\right]\right\} \neq \mathrm{Bxs}\left\{\left[c^{T}{}_{2}\right]\right\}$$

etc. ('=' Bjs)

$$\text{and } TM \equiv \left\{\left[mc^{M_{1_{1}}} + \ldots\right]\right\} \xrightarrow{\{Ia\}} \left\{\left[c^{TM}{}_{1}\right]\right\}.$$

$$\left\{\left[mc^{M_{2_{1}}} + \ldots\right]\right\} \xrightarrow{\{Ib\}} \left\{\left[c^{TM}{}_{2}\right]\right\}.$$

$$\mathrm{Bxs}\left\{\left[c^{TM}{}_{1}\right]\right\} = \mathrm{Bxs}\left\{\left[c^{TM}{}_{2}\right]\right\}$$

Iteration:

$$\mathrm{Bxs}\ \Bigl\{\Bigl[c^{I}a1\Bigr] \neq \mathrm{Bxs}\ \Bigl\{\Bigl[c^{II}a1\Bigr]\Bigr\} \longrightarrow \qquad (\mathrm{Bj}\ '=')$$

$$\mathrm{Bxs}\ \Bigl\{\Bigl[c^{M}{}_{1}\Bigr] \neq \mathrm{Bxs}\ \Bigl\{\Bigl[c^{MM}{}_{1}\Bigr]\Bigr\} \longrightarrow \qquad (\mathrm{Bj}\ '=')$$

('M' type indices (modalities) deal with interset and 'end'/ 'beginning' concatenations.) A concatenatory pair in respect of 'M' is -

$$\Bigl\{\Bigl[mmc^{M}{}_{1*_{1}} + mmc^{M}{}_{1*}\Bigr]\Bigr\}_{2} \xrightarrow{(=)} \Bigl\{\Bigl[c^{M}{}_{1*}\Bigr]\Bigr\} \qquad \text{etc.}$$

And with interset concatenations a pair is:-

$$\Bigl\{\Bigl[mc^{M}{}_{1_{1}} + mc^{M}{}_{1_{2}}\Bigr]\Bigr\} \xrightarrow{(=)} \Bigl\{\Bigl[c^{M}{}_{1}\Bigr]\Bigr\} \qquad \text{etc.}$$

We want more than just a set of formulae. What do we say? What is a set of questions? Aren't there peculiar situational modalities involved with a set of questions and satisfactory (R to AL_1) answers in comparison with 'just the discourse'? Remember that with the answer to a question possibility - erotetic structure passim - your life is made a formality ... Why that possibility is not a triviality is because the structure operates under (revisable) world views. The Bx-ing is not the scalpel dissecting a part of nature ... although it is mapping ... it is just an activity ... just nature ... 'just' memory as selective filtration of the oratio recta (syntactically) embedded discourse.

Questions demand an answer ... Ask yourself what you would say even if nobody was listening or if you got the message in some wierd language outside logic... (...How to Bxal, i.e. reduce the message to two or three pages. Map the first message from nothing I said ... take the material and 'blurt' through it... But cardinality of the material as points of reference remains a problem ... it only remains intractable when a priori weights are attached to the Bx-ing...) ...'A whole life' - unheard (or restricted) message as (the) point of reference.

The prospect of using the index ... and a Bx message from the (activity of) choosing from N-lines. We must make it clear that this is towards and not from a form of embedding. It must be an ethical message ... less than exemplary perhaps. The indices are not readily negotiated. Index selection must be extracted as something just possible, but in accord with some criteria stronger than the (present) psychologically faint ones. Take the Bn Trislander as a point of reference ... and Bxal ... and find resonances, i.e. a mapping, a set of co-ordinates, consists not in extracting anything in a comparison of two items. Instead the mapping/salvaging is more like extorting something as set conditions.

Why a revision of ideology? It must function as a critique of the question of questions. Bxal must extend somehow ...

Bxal al Bx, etc. plus modalities of some type - (AL) as such must be related to an open set of intervals - of any point of reference and/or the interpretation of any modality. We cannot make that distinction between surface and depth for the possibility of an item of discourse. Our problem is the unsaturated set of predicates between items along an ordinal continuum which are products of those predicates... They are, so to speak, quantified by 'R'. One point about this is that it's not universal grammar; a rational series would be post-ordinal and any addition to that series including anaphor/re-iteration/interpretation at any (i), etc. is a revision of the whole of that continuum ... it's another continuum ... for 'R' contains the conditions for the 'next item' and the 'previous item' (identity).

There is no sentential dimension to the matter; it may not be concerned with the idea of a sentence at all - it is a dialogue unity. What's that? A kind of context. And why just that? It must be an ideological function that's involved, i.e. dialogue is the context in which learning occurs. The question of questions is parenthetically involved. Learn the message ... I want you to... This is pointless. There is no maximally generalized message, but a dialogical mapping of what to do with knowledge. This is how to see one's situation as problematic. There is a non-conformity to the conditions of rationality - that is, to knowledge. The conditions of change (or just the conditions of self-consciousness) consciousness:– this could be communication through history ... to dispense with it once you have understood it. But what's the significance of that?

Examine and perpetuate:- these are deontic assumptions. Why ideological revision? It is with an absolutely ethical stance that one examines the forgetting claim. The forgetting claim is not just what you have, for what you have is input. But how do you deal with input without resorting to a model of the brain ... as mind? We deal with the changes of ordinally embedded points of reference which function from point to point as a continuum through non-logical reverberations. That sense of a dynamic transitivity of a set of life dimensions is the funtion for the possibility of revision, and not just absolute duties.

But it's not a singleton concept or singleton deontology. It must be a set which includes a reminder - of what? Ossification? We have in certain set conditions interpretation as teaching, i.e. a dynamics in the discourse towards and away from a point of reference ... as all points of reference are the function of - what?

...'Interpretation' isn't enough. That can be done with the hybridity of the Bxal By Cal notation. What about Bxjw Byal? This would be like matching (worlds).

jw ≠ al, and jw ⟶ + al, and al ⟶ + jw ... or jw (al) and al (jw). That does not mean that much. And ... Bxal 1,2,3,etc. ... syntax modifiers is too early to presuppose. (N.B. we still want to characterize 'point of reference' somehow. We are on about something that does transcend language.)

jw + al and vice versa ... discussion of 'our' slate a la Hamblin ... 'he just fails to continue.'

Indices here can't just be hypothetical - that is, I can't express jw in the same way as I can al. al is a point of reference... There is a set Bxjw = or ≠ Bxal. Now it's obvious that at least one jw integer/concatenata is not Bxal, i.e. Bxjw al Byal (or Bxal jw Byal). Is it important we be left with this type of hybrid? We can ask a question whether a structure exists ... it's doubtful.

An access point for the ... adaption of Bxal now everyone has some kind of gestalt of it. Bx By C is actually under review. What more can it be made to capture? A more specific sense of modality? Neither is acceptable as such for congruence is of little consequence. An ultra-refined modality list would be the wrong type of improvement. The idea of a point of access or ascent keeps rearing and getting in the way as a value rather than an absolute location of Bx By C. Concatenation still implies an intensional 'shift' and continuity in a formal way (perhaps pace trans-world-heir-lines) (Ordnuungscharakter?). What other formulae should there be, if that is a proper question to ask at the present? Something quite simply as $Bx_{(i)}$ where one is provided with an access to the index, or interpretation. Access would/could be a commonality of set conditions. But we can't attach too much importance to a set's boundaries (defence, strength, etc.) except as an historical fragment. Anyway, the most common feature as access point would be 'English class' orthography which would leave untouched the question of collectable anaphora ... rather pseudo-anaphora - context sensitivity.

Bxal (index) By (index) Index ≡ conditions al or the same index or the same access point. What wants doing is that which will ensure an adequate proliferation of the concatenation enterprise... But don't the modalities of jw appear to be somewhat in the wrong place? ... They have, at the moment, no structural significance. Bxal/smiling/worrying/cf. other grammatical structures à la Montague.

There is the opaque absoluteness of going-on and the absurd construction of transcendentalism on an Husserlian aspiration. The result is a zero-indexing of every item... All we require - no, hoped for - is the possibility of a generalization/generalizability and not a generativeness. Bx included in I is not a nomological situation of any kind ... it's the plotting of the inordinate, or radically vacillating in a concatenatory pseudo-particle. An adaption or redemption of Montague's point of reference (i.e. DS_1) system still eludes us. We haven't answered the question, 'what is modality going to be like?' Bx_{lexis} $By_{lexis\ TG1}$, etc. ?

You can't exclude any Bxal from iterations, but you can't use jw-type lines either. Iteration may be seen to be accelerating away from the original set membership conditions you are unhappily trying to reinforce. That is, you have something like a set-sorting problem.

Bxjw, where jw is a set of possible worlds or a set of alternative locutions/statements although we can't make the set denumerable. We can however assume a static sort of hybridity - any left-hand member of a pair of pairs is ≠ to a right-hand member with respect to the index (assuming at least that there is something to learn).

Bxjw/hybrid byjw/hybrid = Bxal n By Cal... With a function B into al, what do we concede to the modalities? Certainly not just a family of syntactic categories ... except as an archaeological parable. That is (pace

Lisson Gallery posters), the set theoretical assumptions demonstrate your belonging, or not belonging, to al_i ... unless you want to treat every instrumentality as a (higher) form of alienation. But you can't have an a-historical phenomenology-immanence, just as methodology isn't possible protected in semantic neutrality... What about the cardinality assumptions with our phenomena? And can we talk of the inputs into our ideological set/discourse as phenomena-data? Homomorphism won't help us to find anything out. The morphically identical is no proper index.

That aspect which is just blurting is simply mapping, rationalism included. Under which conditions are any of the sets closed? Are they sets without modality strain? ... Think of jw as a situational parameter (that's not just 'context of use' generalized) including what is non-rational (or instead sets up new conditions of rationality - as continuity of surface plus (etc.) - as going-on), the inductive, cultural, etc.

A scheme of presentation.

T = class of transformational mappings, C = a criterion of convergence, P = a procedure for learning... Is 'iteration' partly a procedure? ... Anyway, T, or Bxal, as a 'model' could post-date the operations. Interpret $C1 \longrightarrow 2\ jw \longrightarrow B1(x)al \longrightarrow B2(y)al \longrightarrow Caljw$. This does get closer, but perhaps we want more structure in the description of the learning situation ... everyday life(?)

Or put 'M jwal' at the front of any string of notation with an arrow (take it as 'occur'). Bx is going to be parasitic on more than the mere 'order' of sensory input. And what's the indexing back a caricature of? M jw is partially a function, but is a product itself of the function Bxal By Cal, so that it gets into the index as an iteration 'M jwjwal'. We can be carefree about getting every function into the index as an iterated modal alternative (as a possible selection restriction). M 1-20 modalities provide neither closed nor 'interpreted' sets.

jw - an examination method ... do we have a way into the transformational component? Can we adequately describe it, even if it proves to be cumbersome methodologically? Anyway, what do we have? Classes (pre-transformational) and our formalizations (set history approaching transformation)? The cardinality issue arises (whither points of reference) with Bxal al, saying this item j is away from that point of reference i - yet j is i's neighbour. Traditionally 'neighbouring sets' has been a euphemism in logic for the intractability of 'interpretation'.

al is only 'relative' in a sense to any possible proliferation thereof, i.e. Mal, or perhaps better al Mal, makes it parasitic upon Bxal... But you see the problem arising from Tractatus-like injunctions about 'language' and the 'world' ... the parameters: '$where_i$ am I?', 'who_j am I?', 'why_k?', '$what_1$?', etc., etc. relative to the set - past sets - 'me'; or the identity crisis of al answered relative to the iterations of al, al, etc.

Perhaps in nature/Naturlogik the open interval is by no means feasible ... an anthropomorphic diagram - Bxal, Bx M, Bxal M - and assume a finite set of prescribable operations for any Bxal or Bxalal, etc.

There's no other way than in the language we know best ...

Following the lexical pathways in the abstract is to follow them as something beyond (outside rather) the periphery. We have considered this in relation to the Husserlian problems of transcendental idealism... What is excluded from that possibility anyway is synthesis. For example, you ask yourself a question (in a moral life) that doesn't preclude an answer which may provide an alternative set interpretation of the original question.

We still have revision and genuine learning (≠ extrapolation - whatever that might be) to deal with.

The general historical suggestions and crises are situational mappings as panaceas pace David Kaplan and T. M. Cheng.

There's no other way than in the language we know best; that's pretty well daft.

It's not enough (it's out of place) to say you have to find the principles of and for interpretation. The phenomenological situation of ersatz empathy - judging - having an opinion - ideology - are inexhaustive complexities.

The possibility of samples (sic) of everyday discourse provides us with mappings considered iteratively, e.g. Bxal By Cal, 1,2,3, etc. (Galleria Schema). That is, ideology can function as something like a dynamic margin of our soul contents (pace Lukacs). But do you want a type of fit for the margin - a normal form - that is computable?

...Translation may be feasible. At least, in proportion to anaphora and sociological/anthropological concepts impinging upon us like 'entrenchment', or better 'sloganizing', we can cope with translation in Bxal Bjal that is supererogatory over the semantic theories' (and others') tradition.

al will be a furtherance of a situational parameter. How psychologically real are they when we consider running down the list of modalities in the index? When we consider the translation situation - which is only making guesses within a limit, what conditions exist for a language (at an indexical point)... to be revised at each indexical point. Consider your choice in al (restriction) 1 ... as a dialegical arrangement. Dialegical items are in no way to be regarded as explanada. They are only conditions of various kinds - some kinds of items might be thought of as mere pointers, but you might be able to do without them. An item may be peculiar in that its set conditions may be vestigial. But a vestigial item may be the exhausted one.

An historical/historicized fragment may possess a/be dynamic... (What is message and what is noise?)

We must remember that these dialegical items should be considered as intensional interpretation, or at a time, or a circumstance, or a situation. Para-linguistical attitudes may be a proper way to examine a situation's modalities (access to), but to what extent, if at all, are we free to describe a dimension/parameter independently from any other dimension/parameter of that dialogical situation? A situation may be more than a single point of reference. But a point of reference as something other than a neighbourhood excludes the possibility of a revisionary generalization from that point of reference, or it becomes the function of absurdities with any identity criteria that may seem natural ... i.e. there could be no distinction for the set theoretical assumptions between iterated and non-iterated conditions. A point of focus would be able to deal with the interpretative changes (revision) on any fragment of surface. However, what can we call conditions of Darwinian descent (i.e. belonging as a subset of a set not yet identical (in any of its conditions) with any other set - 'same' or 'relational')?

We must be prepared to bet in a restriction. But this starts with the situation ... and go-on to produce less. The bet is on how you are prepared to feel on the dialogical/dialegical slate - the problematicness...

...But nevertheless we can say at least this much to linguistics: forget about sentences and try to think about 'pairs'... The 'R' relations is by no means footless - but we don't want to single out 'form' and 'content' features.

We have a resonating membership; what's involved in counting (cardinality, say) is a commonality plus a functional property - there is that generalizability - with respect to Bxal = we have a non-sameness with respect to an (as yet unknown/not on the map) example. (That's an (orthodoxically) odd way of dealing with the modalities and their existence.) That is, we have features held in common in respect of a dynamic principle ... what can we describe as - nature? There is a tactical relation ... signal - index_i - index_j plus 'structure/order' ... ? Conversation is a 'true' item that we cannot pronounce. Are we thinking of a conversation Ao and item ao as structural? Surely there is the notion of resonance in respect of indices between members (ao, ai, etc.) indexed to human members, but you can't make an iterative list so easily without being clubfooted.

Now, what can we say is characteristic of continua? Surely not an 'in and out of phase'? Although a concept of phase would capture a series fault/acceleration/multiplication of any failures (or successes) with an 'understanding' set nexus/inclusion, the scalar features of a pragmatic parameter are not dealt with in any way save at the point where they all touch upon an iterated magnitude - plus the generalizations from there.

Post Bxal -

Disregarding any claim made on behalf of linguistics about a possibility of a grammar, there are, nevertheless, some problems about an indexed semantic description to tackle - or to forget. If anyone hopes - inter alia this text - for the generalization and generalizability from any single point of reference (or set/embedded set), he must come to terms with the possibility of ideological revision within an historical, generative (surface) string, and that possibility of revision (= learning) versus structuralism. The picture of that activity, of a typed and generalizable set of dialogical items, is simply ... a circumstance whose functions are no different from the functions of that categorized item. This isn't merely the possibility of the devolution of '='/identity criteria in the prima facie (sic) phenomenological (Natur). We just can't make those assumptions about inputs. It is a theological problem of ontology ... rather ontogenesis ... as a key to any epistemological (and other) problems. Natural necessity (approaching the decision in the limit of an index's iterated marginal modalities) is multiplied (by experience/imagination/memory/'real time') over entities. That's our problem of problems perhaps; our world accelerates away from the methodological principles ... or any work at all.

(That is, ideological revision isn't the projection/ability (with what operators anyway?) from new inputs and a selective filtration conditionality.)

So, any continuum, rational, cardinal numbers, etc., like information inputs, is an assumption for surface data (perhaps happily you can't learn anything by drill). Depth shows discontinuities simply by disjunctions - surface holds no aesthetic significance ... it doesn't exist... There are no quantified unbound variables although each item/index can be treated with reinterpretation.

Black holes or naive consciousness versus the Copernican revolution or 'The Pragmatics of Natural Languages'

We should think of Lukacs' 'ought' for discovering our history-culture. But isn't that stuff about (in)authenticity a bit much? What modalities are functions of reflexivity? That is, what lower limit would you give for a type of modality for an ideological point of reference? It's an absurd question ... that sort of 1930's understanding involves revision although the set problems show it to be a triviality.

The deontic aspect of contingencies and counterfactuals is confronted with a range of (alternative) possible states of affairs although every modality in a list is treated in some way in choosing within that limit (cf. John Weber show, New York). What happens to me when I make that choice - as a problem of interpretation - a phenomenological gut-reaction? ... We're a bit late for Karl Jaspers. Perhaps there is a non-logical necessity of some kind... Certainly, possibility is a context approximation. Neighbouring modalities of a single point of reference/focus is a mathematical problem, but what we may have is praxiologically of 'significance'.

Choosing Mi as part of an Analytic Teleology ... the necessity of the modality of motivation producing the a priori possibilities is our Cartesian product. This is not just to take seriously a task of papering over the cracks of (logico, et al) ellipses.

Re: an historical angst for going-on and stopping - to be bowdlerised in the reduction to extension, i. e. stopping (short) a conversation - or cutting the Turing-machine tape - as an asymptote of a neo-Apostelian satisfaction... (An accelerating aggregate of (mappable) points of reference/significance produces simply a more complex single point of (Geistes) competence for topicality.)

Motivation within a non-diachronic axis of reference points - we could think of any domain of discourse as open in the following picturesque way: X as hearer provides the conditions for Y's (as speaker) motivations and modalities of what is said. So much for subjectivity-epiphenomenalism. (Those with models of the mind have no problems to deal with.) The world may determine us, however. This is there the necessity of a point of reference gets in. The Apostelian (and others') picture above has to make distinctions between a message and noise ... how could you cope with a situation as hearer talking to yourself? Talking to yourself as having competence (dialogically) in that situation?

'A speaker's activity/actions lead to need satisfaction with the co-operation of other organisms' (part of the Reidel club). Instead, we must try and get closer to the 'natural necessity' rather than the possibilities of nature. It would be a funny situation to depend upon the co-operation of other organisms to at least know whether need-satisfaction was successfully embedded ... in what sort of set? Teleological satisfaction is probably related to our inputs, but we cannot think of that set-satisfaction as Hegelian synthesis... As it were, after concluding one conversation (teleologically satisfactorily), we then go on to construct or generate new conditions for motivation for the next conversation ... if we could ever make the discrimination between one linguistical item of (what?) experience/ideology from a non-linguistical item. T. M. Cheng, asking what it is to ask yourself a question, tries to argue that one can make claims for ideological disjunction... But there's something unholy about that claim; you're supposed to ask a question when you know when there is a gap in your information bank... 'Information'? When a question is answered satisfactorily you never ask a question again, i. e. anschauung and gestalts, etc. At least we do not want a cloying praxiology, the fellow traveller of cybernetics and invidious naturalism. But we are still left with a determinism of sorts. Certainly when x = hearer, y = speaker, $\{(xI_i = yI_i)\ r\ \emptyset\}$ as a wellformed formula, we don't have a truism or an extrapolation of a dialogical situation.

There is no a priori distance between the paired items of discourse. Nor is there between a succession of points of reference between speaker and 'response'/mapping. If J includes an open interval of which i is included as a member, then I and J are neighbouring sets ... but any modality may be included with i in that interval as a condition of commonality for I and J. That's an ordinal series. Any other expression of two items would sound like an Hegelian search for the unity of Das Volk.

Succession, continuity, unity and aggregate

In an ordinal series, I (Mi) 2 (Mi) 3 (Mi) ... etc., (Mi) contains conditions of identity as well as dynamics. If you like, that modality possesses the possibility of 'everything' within that series. Also, any fragment of the continuum, such as 1 (Mi), contains as a single point of reference the Ordnuungscharakter of the items $0 - n$, or rather $0 - n_i$. That is a continuum expressing a unity for all simple particulars, while each particular is dependent on the rest of the items (in an intensional way). This is a type of natural denumeration ... but we may find ourselves with 1 (Mi) 2 (Mj) 3 (Mk) ... etc. It is also an irrational denumeration. i, j, k, etc. may be the indexical points of what? ... A possibly generalizable series of natural numbers despite the fact that it wouldn't matter where you started counting in the series.

The continuum of your memory-making judgements (Hume?) as a ground - and any fragment of that succession would be a figure. The compactness of that ground would be the possibility of a commonality of that succession of fragments ... that possibility realised would have to be a 'sickness unto death'. We cannot recognise that ground as non-finite. However, a non-finite ground could be seen as an a priori generalization, and simply mapping a posteriori. Is that the way to express the contra-local/global argument? All that that 'authenticity' stuff does is to generate a (back)ground qua ground ... the possibility of that ground and the figure in relation to it remains intractable.

So, we have a para-structural situation (Da-Sein$_i$) characterized by possibility and the non-fabricated Lukacsian 'ought' outside that indexical point.

Ordering a pair thus - 'iM_1j' - would give us the compactness of figure-ground$_i$.

We have a parody of inductive learning ... the logical non-possibility of choice; the evaporation of any sort of mono- (or paired) continuum of state descriptions - 'logical space' - in induction; an increase in the complexities of criteria of identity with an increase of data - increase in information $\neq$ increase of certainty. There is an irrefragable certitude of memory at i, only that i belongs to an historical pathway of sorts.

Denumerability may be in extensio, but it is a reduction from the intensional mood (rather than mode) that facilitates the cardinality problem of space, i.e. the cardinality may be dependent upon the depth (complex non-types) of the aggregate/numbers. And hopelessly, there is no countable relationship between the ordinal and rational numbers/points of reference if you're thinking of cardinality approaching rationality ... There is no reduction to or from intension.

A typology of teleological modalities - what are the possibilites of a (display of) teleological coherence? And the former a product of the latter! This might be the requirement of a dynamics of a string of items of discourse ... i.e. the motivation modalities provide the commonality plus the possibility of generating that string ... going-on a priori ... which doesn't say much. But not that memory is not a product of a chain of linguistic/depth functions ... a continuum (the discourse) is a single, the last, point of reference. So, whither the idea of teleological coherence? And, whither a teleological string of functions as the cause of (obviously) isolated particles of (- what? ... consciousness?) ... ?

Every modality of an ordinality must be placed in its proper position in relation to every other modality. That is, excluding the possibilities of counter-series/factuals ... so the axinomic typology will be of no importance whatsoever. But one is faced with phenomenological problems (with at least their methodology) of trying to include what will be a range of immanent fragments of a generatively/generating immanent whole.

Demystifying mystical hermeneutics (phenomenological gut-reactions) by bracketing - and carrying over to another index - any culturally based intuition (i.e. parts of discourse/'everything') might be something like a lattice. However, there is something funny about a lattice after our difficulties with an ordinality. At best a lattice at i ... this only compounds our problems (Mi = or ≠ Mi).

Suggestion: reciprocating the Husserlian bracketing for any clustered set, or simpleton, of a (non-)given cultural aspect ... provides a dissertation, an inventory or a brainstorm - exhaustively at i, producing yet more teleological modalities, yet localising the cultural set I to Ii... From then on you suppose a generalization from that exhaustive 'completeness'.

There might appear to be a parody of reduction by putting the phenomenal data given in the brackets of (structure, frozen historical fragments) suspension. (This 'appearance' is a product of some quibbling over the difficulties of any type of reduction. There is a puzzle not over elementality, but prior to the wave/particle argument reduction to the extensional or intensional modes.) What is bracketed may be the a posteriori given surface only. Interpretation is really given to you - reduction as such is one of the least of your structuralism problems... The 'reduction' relation is as hopeless (in the tradition anyway) as intensionality is to the intensive.

The certainty of topicalization - giveness is not a matter of set inclusion or denumerability. How about a t-series of a naturally enumerated topicalization ... so that, as it were, counting/topics occur naturally with an exhaustive interval in between the ordinals = cardinals?

If there is a position, then it is, at most, a miasmatic transcendentalism. And transcendentalism only because there are a large number of functional and structural properties that in extension ... no, because there are sociological inputs - there is a determinism on us - which is other than simply in extension.

An axis of regularity? Any counterfactual 'state' is 'necessarily laid upon us', accorded with the function of succession, which may not be trivial in relation to that necessity. Gratuitous detail: for the laws of regularity such that ... perhaps forget this because of I, =, or R in 1 R 2 R 3, etc. when no mapping can exhaust R - 'is not known to coincide with its scope or predication and neither can its scope be found or reached'.

Similarly - and back to points of focus - with any hybrid concatenation in Bxal By Cal is x(y) and an embedding conundrum, and any further item is embedded in such a way. Each function is an accumulator such that the predicate at n being an aggregate of a complex of functions at n ... N. B. R or Mi is the ordinal and single category - or indeed, the singly dynamic. (But that is absurd for a single lattice.) The answer to the doubts about the concatenation's epistemic status as (easily) defeasible is that we can't see any series as a part of a lattice structure, although we may naturally enumerate a fragment's topicality - even count a number of fragments for pairing - as a possibility of a Naturlogik. With a quantitative order as a 'natural possibility', we are dealing with an infinite number of actualisable fragments/series and at the same time a magnitude without divisibility - a stem index.

THE OLD GOURMET (TRANSCRIPT)

... We are talking to G. Lukacs again.
I was trying to ask 'why conversation?' as if it didn't matter how recursive the question might be. Why consider it in a self-conscious way?

A parenthetical suggestion... that has a fairly complex history... was that there is available to us a mapping (some mapping) onto a transcendental idea of an 'art'... the distinction between art and life? The transcendentality of the noumena does not merely consist in the logistic rehersal of philosophical scandals. There's a way in which one can consider the non-utopian alternative without recourse to a rehearshed illogic. (This is within dialogue) ... the dynamic of going-on...
Any access one has to ideology/revision of ideology (where ideology constitutes a statical basis for a question of questions) involves a comparison zero-index which functions in relation to a standard dialectic.

Seeing one's situation as problematic involves a non-conformity to the conditions of rationality... conditions of dialogue continuity (de facto).
The situation in which the question of questions (ideology - the possibility of an art) can be mooted has always been an anthropological-historical scandal. We have had a polarity of the sciences and the ideal of the cultural continuum rammed down our throats. Contrastive activities are either exactly in phase, or exactly out of phase... the possible activities are, however, resonant only as discrete units... mesomerism is just a hope for a strange 'scientism'. Our activity (whoever we are and whatever it is) can't take the concatenation of historically vacuous idealist slogans as its teleological parameter.

So we can't escape: we do what we do from the interior of our language(s) and not as a consequence of the postulation of meta-levels so beloved by naive (e.g.) concept artists. The possibility of the revision of ideology consists in the uncovering of a dynamic dimension (character) of intension in dialogue/dialectic. Dialogue/dialectic is mesomeric with respect to the various possible intensions encapsulated therein... ways of going-on. This suggests a mesomerism at an interstructural level: the discourse takes place in the deep castellations of a wide range of indices. The epistemological world poses a problem for the community (us) - in relation to the prospect of (our) overcoming the conditions of rationality posed and provided by that world. But this also constitutes the genesis. We are confronted by the dialectical obduracy of epistemological determinism. And, taking that seriously, we are likely to have to employ operative notions which lack any theoretical depth... Simple-minded, casual... To say that the possibility of ideology is accessible from the intensive study of dialogue is not to specify which dialogue type. A dynamic principle is invoked so as to cope with the problem of the defeasibility of indices. Dialogue types may be considered from the point of view of topicalization (figures and grounds) - in the absence of a formal theory... We have little choice but to compare everything with everything that comes into view... The philosophical problematology espoused earlier has merely disguised a scandal of dereliction: interpretative possibility vis a vis dialogue is no more than experience/soul-marginal.

All right... dealing with relations... what sort of relation would we have in respect of (our) dismissal of the continuum?... Presumably we are in a continuum with regard to the historical problems of 'paintings' and 'painters' (etc.). Philosophers and philosophers of mathematics ... and God knows who else; we're dealing with a single point of reference and then trying to split things up. ... We are, perhaps, splitting-up the various ordinalities between elemental parts and inserting various predicates between those parts. In proposing attention to the problem of problems, you can't expect any transformations from any existential points of reference. It's an arcane issue what that may encapsulate. Not an 'Ex' certainly. The question remains whether this suggests that the possibility of interproblem isomorphisms (or interconditional isomorphisms - or interconditional relations) is not in principle discernable. Isomorphism is not so much a problem. One of the (our) main difficulties is related to the observation that it's easy to find a relation of some sort... an isomorphism... from the single, unique point of reference to the anaphor of the next single, unique point of reference:- it's merely a matter of lowering the condition strength so as to catch a commonality of some kind.

'Transformation' may be a set of conditions supervening over the nature with which we communicate. And this might amount to a continuous set. The conditions are (in a sense) 'prior' to any self-consciousness on our part. ... What is discussed here is a continuum about... between (what has been thought of as) production in what?, art?, and (what has been thought of as) production in 'science'. ... I'm saying that it's characteristic of a continuum that one can point to 'opposite ends' and they can be essentially resonant. This issue might be saved-up for later. It may at the moment be more important to generalize that sort of relation (or the problem thereof) rather than to make any attempt to specify objects. Normally, the postulation of a cultural continuum involves the assumption that there's something like 'art' and 'life'... Why dwell on that? There are borrowings still... but there are ways in which there is no natural limitation... that's the first problem... I think people are saying 'O.K., I can comment on the scientific picture in this or that way... but I can't initiate ideology - and the philosophical/ideological grounds for problems in science are scientific'. (And there's another argument to say that they are not... essentially not... therefore the mapping of the scientific problem onto the community or its conditions is the place where it has to take over ideology... you cannot function in that sense... or it ceases to be a continuum... ceases to be anything that can involve phase comparisons. Perhaps we are involved in functional characteristics here).

The functional characteristics of an item of dialogue may be considered in the absence of other (i.e. formal) characteristics... I'm trying to think in relation to what I think your cultural model is like... we'll get out of this in the end. Assume that your cultural model is one which is represented by the Tate (Gallery). Now, what you've got in the Tate is the functional common point of reference... That there are common functional points of reference is highly problematic - you can argue... the problematic is here ... or if you like, 'THE DIALOGUE'. Assume that dialogue is not just surface, but transformational, in the sense of having depth. The depth of that dialogue is the problem encapsulation (ideology?)... At the same time you have, so to speak, a form of hybridity which is somewhat based on the idea of a sameness of some kind between the functional properties of whatever you say there (in that place). The functional property is... the problems... based on the idea of an existential point of reference... 'we're in the same room,' etc. There is also discontinuity... - or the congruence - rule basis which is the fact that the contributions to the chat are several rather than joint. You've got however, input which is formally or otherwise distinct. That's presumably something to do with the Tate as a single point of reference - in terms of some strata (vectorial, or what?). At the same time, on other strata it may not be the same... i. e. you don't have the same ordinal relationship between one point and another in the discourse... A series of arrangements which is 'order' in one way or another... But that 'order' is not structure. 'Order' here is not anything which can be too well sorted... it's parasitic upon such problems as the difference between an idealized speaker and an idealized hearer. The idealized hearer is always interpreting sensory input - from one point of view; the speaker is all output and there's no problem of interpretation... or anything structural... He has no place... he's just a tactical point of reference(?). We are thinking of the reason why (e. g.) we're not talking about the 'question of question's' being in some correspondence to the old claim about the difference between art and life... i. e. '... The art... ' Look up old Art Internationals... or talk to a painter.

Someone might consider us to be entirely devoted to mapping... and suggest that we thereby miss, among other things, the problem of an inclusive (precluding) set. ... Mapping the art bit rather than the life bit. Despite the parascientism of our overt experiencings... or perhaps because of it, mapping life essentially raises the possibility of change... (cf. remarks about Bx-ing as scalpel and as nature). A simple set-embedding situation with respect to art and life offers one greater problems of set inclusion than a purely surface syntactical situation. a) It's because you are dealing with it now in pure interpretation save that your indexing is non-iterative... but that might mean that... Does it mean that it is also not marginal as well? b) Any indexical (paralogical (what else?)) assumptions are non-iterative modalities from a single point of reference which may or may not have or support commonality conditions, plus convergence-divergence vectors... which perhaps is what occurs when someone talks of 'extrapolating something'. ... The old idea was not that you had a situation in which there were no self-conscious 'depth' conversation. What you got was simply an idealization of phase ... of the continuum. You've got a quantum and a continuum. Is that all we can say eventually?... We do have the functional property... 'conversation'... going-on... etc... (cf. ideology). Now, apropos an existential continuum of some kind: its modalities are a functional property - so whatever I say in the circumstances, I can argue that it has those (that) functional properties.

You then have all the other modalities of another (MM inter-?) continuum which are the grammatical, formal, orthographical, etc., continua of intervals (modalities) which are integrated holistically'. There will be, intra-set (or axis), a quantifiable difference. We can proclaim, in a way, a point of reference. How do we show (or do we in fact depend upon?) identity between integers of an axis? ...That is, can you operate intra-set -into a single point of reference-when you are dealing with an inter-set situation which is ipso facto embedded? Obviously we don't have an '=/≠' function to work with in discourse...but what? Non-difference as '='?

But what is the accessible top limit this 'formal property' in common?... We surely presume situational parameters and dynamics as points of reference...'production' situations...points of access? Is there any boundary that's discernable? In other words, do you say simply 'in the confines of a room', or do you think of it 'in the confines of an experience'? Well, it doesn't have to have a boundary considered... it has an irrational set of boundaries - just as it has irrationally composed (comported) points of reference. - And not one of these points of reference need be the same. We/you have a series of neighbouring points of reference which can be sorted out in an infinite number of ways.

Another (relative) point is are we saying that there is a rational reconstruction of a dialogical situation's 'depth'; and is rational reconstruction the way you explicitly formulate ideology? We're not saying that quite clearly... we're not even saying, for example, that what we do, what our mappings have been are approaches to all those phenomena floating around...and what we do is pluck these out and rationally reconstruct them so they become explicit workable phenomena. ...But it may be something as bad as that if you say we have these various continua floating about at will. ... Although the nexus-point of possible continua will allow us a vague locution like 'understanding'... an idea of shared experience or whatever... But you've got problems with the idea of those neighbouring sets -you never know what the space is between them. The problem of the amount of the paralogical space between two points of reference stretches... you've got to put a limit on that...-emics. We do make judgements (in hindsight) on the M-dynamics of that (now) marginal interval... it's only an M-ibly quantifiable integer... But that's not quite it ...because the ordinal conditionality on an interval is something like 'every natural number ϵ I'. You change the whole topological feature. Zeno's paradox about the arrow touching 'reality' doesn't arise... you have to think of a change in/of your (closed set) weltanschauung-and so a typology or a question of certainty arises; a closed set > an indexed ideological fragment > 'data'. But the bathetic problem is mapping that series of indexical margins onto a wff set plus its own completeness generalization assumptions...as you can't do that, indexing is in this respect a sickness unto death... There are no injunctions that we treat ourselves as black boxes in relation to indexical revision...but instead consider self-consciousness situations (remembering storytelling, etc.) as paradoxical, and/or undecidable... Going-on is prima facie...and don't think of Lukacs' margins as going 'into' (the same) ideological space... an ideological space at all.

Anyway, how far is ideology, or the question of questions, parasitic upon a point of reference? We now have a question of what you can count as ideology (or a question)... what are their criterial attributes? We're not presumably going to bother about talking about the rationality of our various postulated structures... It could be maintained that what we're doing is claiming things about dialogue or discourse...things about ideology... obligations with respect to the historical mappings forced on us... You can keep going to an infinite regress. We do, to some extent, have the pretension to make explicit what is inexplicit...and that is not to say what is implicit in anything...perhaps. In other words, we have a job in virtue of the non-transcendentalizing possibilities that exist in relations. At the same time, there are transcendentalizing functions, the transcendentality of which is inside the going-on (as the 'M' of going-on)... of certain aspects. Namely those aspects that you can't get to the bottom of (or with) - because of the literal impossibility of closing the gaps between points of reference - the wave. We then get to the question, 'What do you do?'

What would you expect, or what would you allow, as an activity rather than an order? At least you can only show people that there is a plenum of different orders involved...from Russellian natural numbers to stretching magnitudes - God knows what else. And this has nothing to do with the idea of 'being reasonable'...that's partly an answer to the question 'What do you do?' 'Show a plenum...merely show a ...'We mean that unless we've shown something it becomes useless, i.e.when I've shown it it becomes something you have no further way of operating...with your experience with what we've found as a work - as an experience - as an art work - as a thing to confront - it ceases to be. And it's not an object of contemplation anyway. ...It's only an item which constitutes a point of reference which will presumably point the way, point the direction...back to ideology...make ideology explicit...

I'm not thinking of a 'model' - but let's put a reconstruction on that occurrence at the Tate Gallery and assume that somebody comes along and copes with that reconstruction. A reconstruction on a positive level could be one in which someone said 'Ah, that which was (is?) mysterious in the situation is now not mysterious...' Now can we distinguish between what we would call 'a reconstruction' and that situation which is not a form of making explicit that which was a mystery?...Or...what are you saying...? Hyper-artistic instrumentalities obviously don't have to do with the temporal aspects such as the projection of future entities...in the interpretation of a piece of nature... Naturlogik ..that would be adumbrated in an explication of the...what?...the place?... That can be continuously interpreted in discrete ways...from the original model set up... What do you mean, 'the original model set up'?...

'The original model set up': meaning the competence and performance of the Tate Gallery situation - i.e. the interpretation is presumably indexical with respect to what the guy knows...Oh, 'some'...and 'future' interpretations...means you'll have different interpretations to follow... Yes, that's really truistic. Alright, there's one Darwinian descent or another...that also applies to Rudolph Carnap...that also applies to mathematics....and mathematics is not unhistorical; it's only an idealization that might be...the fact is you don't deal explicitly with it... that idealization. That's one difference we're interested in. But what else applies which is not subject to constant reinterpretation? We must consider this thing of making the mysterious explicit...or the inexplicit explicit. It is a way of saying that this situation represents...or...it's a fact that we're confronted with in an overt way in those kinds of situations? In other kinds of conversations...we do not sample everything we say... All...everything we might say, might be, in fact 'directional'...in some sense with respect to ideology or problems or questions...or whatever you want to call it...it's only that sort of situation...i.e. that part of what we sample. That's part of the nature?...No, it's not part of the nature... it's something we participate in - it's not anything we sample in the way anyone samples nature...any sociologist sampling sociological data...or, for that matter, a philosopher sampling the discourse of others. Insofar as the nature is not nature...insofar as the nature is not anything which we communicate in the way an information theorist might suggest an experiment might communicate in adding something of a comment on the question...whether we make the inexplicit explicit. We make it explicit in a different way...is it that? I'm worried about the idea that explanatory talk is what one does. What else is there? What about the model of not stopping someone in the street, and modifying their 'journey' as distinct from talking to them and their continuing a la Kierkegaard wherever they were going?.

Is it then an absolute thing that wherever they're going they will have encountered the art of x or y ... this or that input in some way? Is it just that? That is to say it isn't a question of saying 'Ah, I now have decisional criterion x, but I continue as I was. And at the same time there is literally a dialogical ensemble involving me'. But that seems a bit strange because it is just like every other experience. It seems you would be begging for access although you would have no possibility of capturing the thing in any way. I think of walking up to someone in the street and then saying something to them in relation to the problem of making something explicit that which was not. Maybe it's a matter of confusing someone and then...Try to make inexplicit what everyone thought to be explicit. O.K., maybe that would be a coy way of dealing with what would be (traditional) instrumentalities of some kind. You could argue that making inexplicit what is explicit is a 'whole' activity, but I don't think it's coy. I think it might approach the point...which goes back to the problem of access. They are going to be influenced in some way or confused in particular ways, which we have no way of controlling. We're thinking of drawing various continuums or parameters...They are just saying (like Frank Stella) 'Ah, there it is: someone hitting the ball out of the park'.

I'm struggling a bit...I'm trying to map that back onto the idea of the art and life model which we used (again) as a devillish diagram. We've got the question of questions as a 'beacon'. But is the pattern of complexity merely defeasible 'given enough time'? This could be quite consonant with mystification. Someone might point out that the situation is a lot more complex than he first thought. It would be consonant with mystification, it would also be consonant with explanation. 'The structure is such and such'...somebody might not understand it...he would have learnt something as well: presumably, if you were to iterate (the complexity of) the situation and he was able to group the manifold coming out of a situation and then recognise the possibility of branchings - ambiguities - arising from that situation, or mapping onto it. But again that would be completely different from the idea of the complexity of a situation which has a finite boundary to it. Think of the problem of conversation and topicalization in a conversation: you must say that it limits, or eliminates, some of the various parameters or continua from a fragment of conversation. It has a limit of some kind. In either direction of the continuum as well...Yes? So you're saying there's a mystification, but you'll never have...you're not bothered with that mystification, but you're bothered about a learning situation. Going back to the complexity parody, we're providing them with a more saturated picture. All I'm trying to get to dealing with is how far we are open to the accusation that what we're doing proposes a new field of study, or subject, or something which could eventually sell-out in the way that any other circumstance or discourse could sell-out; do you know what I mean? That you could be open to the charges...I understand the idea of reminding, for example. It is a case of existential reminding, and not much else. That existential reminding takes place so that you don't stop, you don't change, you don't go down to the pub instead of the butcher's - you go to the butcher's just the same ... you're not different - importantly - what you've done is confront the problem of a problem ... Is that it? And that becomes a Kierkegaardian thing of reminding you of you're 'human'. But I don't think it's that - it's an old-fashioned idea/model, his problem with Hegel. Alright, it does peripherally come down to Kierkegaard sort of stopping people from being absent-minded, but there's something in the back of my mind (that won't come out) which is probably very infantile. It's certainly something I understand about the fear of becoming a professional... All we can become is zapped-up Pan Germanic modal analysts ... professors of the pragmatics of natural languages (artists) ... otherwise, we are lay preachers - thinking as daft and pseudo-relevantly as a lay preacher. O.K., let's take another point of view. We've talked about the question of questions, in what way do the questions emerge? The way to answer the charges might be to point out that the teleology is in some sense satisfied - or that there are attempts to satisfy it. If someone says that it (ideology) occurs 'in' dialogue ... the dynamic feature(s) of dialogue, not in the semantic or syntactical feature in terms of transformational grammar, or philosophy ... that might be to do with defensibility and going-on and a few other things. The way things are concatenated (and I don't mean that in our 'al' sense at all) is in fact this feature. This is our condition of questions - or something like that ... so you then make that explicit. Alright - you're back to pragmatics...of natural languages...so what does doing it...apart from (being) having a conversation...what does proceeding constitute aside from a cop-out or a profession...mapping onto the status quo? Is it the fact that it's the mapping onto the status quo that's important? But can't you have some concept of the polarity of a fail-safe device on that mapping?

There's the problem of some kind of access to that mapping...

If you say to someone 'don't forget to put the cat out'...they normally put the cat out...they could fail to be self-conscious...and put the cat out ...they could fail... They haven't asked you a question: 'What shall I do?'...There exist the conditions in which they can do it, but there may be other conditions which supervene, and let them do what they were going to do anyway - the redundancy, apparently of the model-moral parameters is hinted at... Think of the conditions prevailing as common conditions for two people who - they even know they have to put the cat out (basically)... It's just not a question of their being expressionistic, and giving someone a glimpse of a fecund other order of irrationality... it's irrational in a different way...or not irrational in the same way.

Rational access is irrelevant to the problem...with life - between asking a question which is not life...that is in life ... I'm sorry to be using so many picturesque metaphors, etc.,...but we seem to be answering the sort of charges that should have gone-out with remarks how good American neo-Dada was. If the question of questions is not in life, why isn't it? 'In life' might mean that it's accessible in terms of antecedently available (de facto) instrumentalities...or do we mean something else? Do we mean that it's something (we do) that is in some new way breaking out of determinism?...Learning? No, because we/you do learn...but we do mean 'learn', not'drill'. To try and go back to the transcendental aspect of it all...that is, to the aspect in which it's said 'this confronts life'... it sounds a bit like...and about learning - if you learn something, the modality of that learning is about yourself. That's a funny locution. And learning about anything will be a kind of drill-of some kind (?) - Or is it that we don't have that sort of dichotomy? We are dealing with a series of series of nodes-as modalities (nodes & modalities). Are we saying just that there are and could be new formal conventions? ...The continuum exists, but at another level - and that's what the incongruity is. ...i.e. between the circumstances in which you can ask questions and the circumstances in which you can't. In other words, the quantum situation becomes the cultural situation - as such - because you're saying that you're in opposition, but in other circumstances you really are not. It's not an eventual continuum, it's a formal continuum. And I'm wondering about whether we're asking a question about a real problem of disjunctiveness...along a line...a particular discrete edge...or disjunction at all between the various lines/ parameters. Think of the continuum of the society of scientists and the continuum of the society of someone else...let's not get too Zen about it, but you have got 'lines of influence'... Bxal-like in some respects no doubt ... if anything is... which may be thought of as discrete... to have a separate life in some way.

Is the single point of reference we've got to deal with where there is a complexity, a miasma of separate parameters... making a continuum? A single point of reference of what? Well you could have a single point of reference problem... or set of references... and spaces between integers, etc. Is that the way you say that there is in fact a way (a more general way) in which we fit into a continuum... is that in or out of phase? - At the same time there is a way in which 'we' can deal with 'you' - in or out of phase. But there's also another level perhaps... which is based on what?... based on the idea of being a functional property in which you don't ever get to deal with the issue... Are we saying that it's the other way round?

You have to take the whole range of possibilities in your conception of sameness, identity... maybe that's a little too stringent and daft... I don't know whether we are dealing with the problem of identity at all. Think of the possible mappings of some individual of some kind: (i. e.) there is a discrepancy of a sort on one parameter - and we consider it in respect of a very complex situation - what sort of tolerances are you going to allow? You can't think of tolerances? What sort of situations can you deal with... various levels of tolerance - definability... where there is a difference in one part of the mappings... with another part of another mapping. Again, it's a matter of definability and of criteria for strength or weakness of argument. At the single point of reference we can allow the weakest possible strength of argument by saying that it doesn't matter how different all the mappings are... they are still the same. Or-(obviously)-they are all different. But it doesn't matter - but you are just saying that you are not sure what it means - postulating that rule. The rule is based on a sort of congruence rule to the effect that 'if you're going to cope with items of dialectic they must be the same irrespective of how different they are in some other respect'... But we're always going to be in the situation where we're saying there are ways between different pathways... Or... are you saying something about the... is it something analogous to 'expression'. The expression is the same but the context is different...' In other words your 'expression' is the circumstance in which you continue (so to speak) on the basis of failing to have a problem... Your 'content' (so to speak) is the point at which you do have the problems... Oh Christ, it's all too much like Aristotle... No... I would have thought 'expressing it' would have been the other way round - that your content is going to be the same but your expression different... now, how far are they different? We cannot cope with the scenarios of some brainstorms.

Proccedings M2

Going-on (Cal)

The (logical) modalities of the concatenation's indexicalizable set strength can be seen as an instrumental solution to the (pre-) Kantian problem of the possibility of experience - a figure standing in front of an ideological background. But as there is no compactness to the background other than its description by the figure itself, we should think of what is indexed as, perhaps, the non-structural - (non-structuralizable) - ground with (or within) the figure.

So, indexing going-on (Cal) confronts the notion of a 'logical', rational manifold as a grammar: any set of modal values for the conventionalities, satisfaction, commonality... of a pair, triple, etc. may be indexed with any other possible modal value for a pair, etc.

There is going to be the possibility of an a priori 'grammar' manifold only as far as that 'grammar' can exhaustively cope with the range of syntax concatenated plus a range of ideological categories as functions operating as depth (structure) to a pair, triple, etc.

An Hegelian rationality will not be able to deal with the introduction of pragmatic modalities of any dialectic, i. e. placing dialogue in a social situation, i. e. the criteria of defensibility just are not sensitive to context.

Logical contradictions as prima facie examples of grammar (we can't hold up the worn-out and insensitive competence/performance distinction) is not flying in the face of rationality. The orthodox iterated conditions for a satisfaction of an ideological set (the mappings of a depth-grammar) must present themselves from the possibility of reflexivity. (That's an old logical paradox; the point is, recognising the inclusion of (any) pragmatic dimensions is also going to wreck the simple-minded identity relations existing in the 'scientific' mode of expression.)

You could say that the indexing of a single concatenated pair, triple, etc. is from a single ideological/ grammatical point of focus (even though one is thinking of counterfactual instances of the same surface case embedded in different 'contexts').

There is something mystical about a hermeneutics based on sub-specie aeterni. A limited whole and a (generative) grammar?

Perhaps the going-on (Cal) can be seen as phenomenologically (Husserl) zero-indexing anything (traditionally) thought to be transcendental. Certainly an existential problem exists between an item, Dasein, and your indexed aesthetic (!).

The methodological failure - an ontological failure - of access to the possible aesthetic leaves us with no models or sets (a posteriori): even when someone has aspirations towards a career in sociological engineering, a teacher, or just being daft, one should be left with a grammar Annschauung. Isn't Angst the motivation for conversation/going-on (Cal)/dialogue rather than the Chengian notion of 'a gap in information, in our memory'?

The modalities of blurting x and blurting y (in A-L) as categorization presents us again with an ontological problem - but it's distinguishable from the axis of ontic element collecting.

Taking a number of indexed concatenated strings as a 'grammar' set, is it possible to revise that grammar for that (fragment of) text? Wouldn't it be an addition to the number of indexed points of focus? Would it be the same text? N.B. we can't hold out for the surface-depth distinction in semantic information theory just as we cannot for local-global, competence-performance and figure-ground distinctions, i.e. the vapid intensional language sets plus as diachronic categorization; which is based on a 'mind-brain identity thesis'.

The significant point about any single going-on (Cal) mapping of the smallest given fragment of text is that it is a privileged set constituting the conditions for an ideological horizon. Nevertheless, structural generalizations will provide us with nothing less than a hiatus.

Instruction Index a x

Several items of grammatical/mapping information (a 1-a 10) are indexed in the transcript text (a 001). These items should be referred to in the same order as they are indexed in the text (a 001) one at a time. ((For example) a 1 should be referred to when it is indexed (its letter and number appear) in a 001 and it must be replaced before going-on to a 2 . . . and so on.)

a 001

Transcription - 21. 5. 73

Structural paradoxes rely upon a very high level use of the idea of non-identity and surface-datum use of indices. If you felt a bit dubious about the ground of it there was no paradox at all - yet a vast amount of writing - from whom? A trivial universe emerges from Suppes'/Carnap's concerns: recognizing the drawbacks in having to read this back in order to keep up in a sense; almost as one would have to keep up with a kind of modern literature; our equivalent of having to deal with the microsocial even when we are still writing the macrosocial novel - to that degree we are presumably heirs of Dostoevsky (ha! ha! ha!). It is a fact, again we mentioned this yesterday, that the problems we face just cannot be
a1 sloganized. The sloganizing itself... insofar as there can be... if we thought of a set of slogans that we brought out... let us say within a fairly short time stretch of one's activity... one would find that the set of sets represented by the slogans did not represent anything which proffered the prospect of satisfaction. What did we note to Bruno? Where is it? It's in my briefcase... where's my briefcase?

Have you ever thought about (in relation to this problem of induction) trying to demonstrate how absurd a notion of an ideal Art & Language learner is?

Thought of trying to demonstrate it! I know what you mean. I mean, I know, I can think there are ways in which, for example, methodologically one might say that in certain circumstances one did use something like a notion of an ideal learner with respect to a given set of social parameters. But when does that beast... you know... alright... I can envisage circumstances ... (hmmm) - but when does that beast ever come up? Never! When does it come up? It hardly ever comes up. I can't... in fact, I was thinking about it last night, I can't think of it ever coming up. But I thought of it this way, you see: I think ideal art... the ideal anything in a sense suggests (is like) a heavy prescription. I think what we are very low on at the moment is 'prescription' in an obvious sense - although being low on prescription is in a sense prescriptive. Yes. Out 'to do things' - 'this is what you ought to do' - yes, I'm not sure that one is necessarily low on it, but that one has a somewhat (potentially at least) highly contradictory set of items which are supposed to be sufficient to promote or necessitate, or permit, or empower, or otherwise modally circumscribe given sorts of active possibilities. I mean I don't think that it's so much that one's low on them, but if one were to think, hmm, for example, 'this is how you do it,' one could think of probably a set of alternative ways... hmm... given the sort of teleological vectors that were extant in relation to any given meeting, or any given opposition, or polarity of function sets or whatever that... you know in a way that it's a matter... it's not so much a matter of being low on them, but low on

a way of hierarchically ordering them...hmm...'that is what you have to do'. I think we know what we have to do up to a point...but I don't think we know...hmm...let's assume that we can add on to that the idea of what we do first. I don't necessarily mean 'first' purely in the ordinal sense - but it would reduce to a kind of ordinality. I mean I think that might be a problem - and that is lacking prescription of a certain kind. It's not entirely lacking prescription...I don't know... I'm thinking about this idea of an ideal learner - or of sort of showing this to be absurd. I mean one of the reasons that it's absurd is that, for example, the concept of learning...and this goes back perhaps to I think what we were saying about the concept of learning as instantiated by people who purport to be dealing with the psychologistic consequences of Rudolph Carnap. That is, that in fact they seem to assume that there is a way of dealing with a concept like learning... er ...which is in some ways intuitively fruitful or 'experientially', as it were, not highly problematic. I mean it seems to me that is absurd...so that...I mean...finding out what learning is actually...how anyone's going to regard or look at...er ...phenomenologically accessible event which one would regard as a learning event or a set of learning events it seems to me is right out of the question. I mean on these grounds...on the grounds that...for example (as I was saying to Philip) it's not so much a question of deciding what are the minutae of one's discourse, when one's dealing with the analysis of it...not so much that of dealing with the macrostructure or gross items of one's discourse, but actually of being in a position where that question is ruled out of court - where, if you like, the grammars that one is getting to promote, or that one finds oneself rehearsing, have got very little to do with grammars as they are envisaged in contemporary linguistics or logical studies. I just don't understand contemporary
a2 linguistics. I don't understand, for example, Richard Montague, I can't understand a word...after all...because the notation is so totally compressed that it seems to me fairly obvious that you know it's about not talking to linguists...very much about that - because it can be translated up to a point... a lot of it can be translated into a linguistic notation deriving from (sort of) Bloomfieldian normal form notation. I just don't see (er) I don't know the degree...pronomialization in that kind of area is so colossal. You know...the amount of indexicality of the notation itself, the lack of lucidity of the notation itself. We can't look to that world to help us very much. I think another thing one had cause to talk about with Philip was (they sort of heard that tape of that last meeting and this relates to your idea of it being absurd) what an ideal learner is...because if... there must be some cofunctionality of learner and what's learnt. I mean of...(that's a very Fregean thing to say)...but one of the ways in which we can show the absurdity of the difficulty of being able to individuate any part of one's discourse as learnable. Yeah...what they were saying was... (I mean they weren't saying it as badly as this, or as ironically as this)... they were saying something like 'Well, it wasn't very intellectual was it? It seemed a bit anecdotal. How are we going to deal with that from the point of view of transcription.' Now my answer to that is, well, for a

start, there is no requirement of set inclusion with respect to ways in which any transcription might be treated. That's the first thing. You know, in other words, the set of treatments of sets of transcripts, A to D, needn't be the same, needn't include the sets of treatments of the sets D to E. What we want to find out, or what we do in fact find out... what it is we enact... (going back to our (chuckle) conversation in fabulous damp Torino)... er... is not anything which is... (and this is where you're right about prescription)... is not anything which is, at this stage, prescribed, save insofar as it is prescribed for us or is a combination of a feature of our environment and a feature of our conceptual lives. You know, in that sense, pervading our experience categorically. The point is that again it goes back to questions. Philip mentioned this last night - apropos Montague's notions of categories. How many categories are there? If we were to take some of our reproaches to ourselves seriously, we might very well have to say that the concept of category (certainly as it's related to any term) is illegitimate - that there is only one category. We can say no more than that. So that that which we rule out of court (certainly) and that which we didn't rule out of court... that which we accept or reject... whatever... you know... are interrelated in a way which doesn't involve the interrelationships between categories... This would sort of demonstrate or suggest the absurdity, as you put it, of the ideal learner. I mean. I don't think we use learning univocally, I think we use it sometimes to mean 'I learn something in this situation', with respect to his other items of discourse. And I think others of our ways of learning mean something far more heavily psychological than that, and I think some of them do get modelled and encapsulated by paired associates and those kinds of learning. But when they do get modelled by paired associates learning, they don't get modelled by paired associates learning because of the indices of the behavioural disciplines associated with paired associates learning... you know... what's modelled mean? Will, if you were to assume, for example, that there was something which you could set up as an ontologically not entirely defeasible correlate of the sets of beliefs instantiated by paired associates learning doctrine, that would be what I would regard as modelling... in some sense quantifying over it in a way that you wouldn't quantify over it where you denied its appetence. I mean the relationship between application and, if you like, model existence, might be very close - they may be equivalent in fact, or approximately equivalent. That I wouldn't know. What we do, if we briefly say, 'Alright, what we do is we try to see our situation as problematic.' Now what does that involve? It means rejecting induction. It means rejecting Pablo Kant. How do you go about rejecting them? What sort of rejecting is it? Well, it's not refutation, followed by rejection. It's not a Popperian kind of occurrence, or a Hansonian kind of occurrence or a Toulminian kind of occurrence, this rejecting, but at the same time, it is rejection. What is it? Is it the rejection on the basis of holding up for 'fit' (holding-up antecedently available discovery or evaluative framework with respect to fit)? Or is it... is there some a priori position such that one seeks an alternative insofar as one is aware of the ontological universe, or the inductive universe? Do you see what I mean? So that it is a pervasion of one's experience that these alternatives exist. Or, is it a case of rejection as inadequate? I don't think we know that yet. I think it is something we have to get sorted at some time, because it is in fact crucial to the problem of whether we have other people's problems, or not... ha ha. I'll have to give him this pill. I think I'll walk over here and collapse. Rex is going to make cloacal noises for the next half hour. It's going to sound very good in the background. Birds twittering... now it sounds like we are standing by a pen full of pigs. Farmyard impressions.

Well, it gets harder not easier, that's for sure.

Well, sit Bernard, I can see him knocking it over... hmmm... this business of categories which seems to be non-problematic in the sense of saying, 'How many are there?' So why worry.

Well, it isn't even that... I don't think... I don't see it quite like that, it seems to me that (let's say, if we are going to be talking about some kinds of language)... it seems to me that the categories that are generally proffered represent the possibility of the coverage of such a trival part of one's discourse. And this, whether it be a standard or apparently standard (but deviant) semiotic self-embedded kind of string that one tends to generate, or alternatively whether it be of some other area. Whatever kind of language or activity we regard as in some sense associated with the purveying of semantic or other information, of psychological information, etc., etc. of proceeding... what we regard as that... it seems to me that it is only going to represent a very trivial part thereof. You could very well ask yourself the question whether it's not only the case that it deals with a very trivial part, but that the concept of category may be rendered totally useless insofar as it may be necessary to actually distinguish with respect to type... (you know... every item of interest in the range of discourse... or every item... that one can catch in that range of discourse). In which case categories become, obviously, rather inadequate and trivial things. It is also a fact, I think, that (since we're talking about categories) when one is talking about a model (I mean, one deliberately talks about a model in a way which is still a little bit like the way it would be talked about in physics, which would be like a concrete interpretation - not 'model' in terms of a Kemenyan mathematical theory) all it means is 'mathematical theory in some areas', and I don't think that's what we mean when we are talking about a model.

Well if you look at whatever it is we are attempting to structure... if you look at the reason for structuring it as an attempt to catch every item we construct, or use, or whatever you like... plain description seems to be overpowering. You can't surely just leave it at that and move to do things, you have to make some further kinds of decisional areas.

Oh yes! What it means is that presumably one... I mean we've got a funny position... vis-a-vis how far one's dealing with fragments... and how far one's dealing with positively generalizable principles... for example...

I mean no doubt certain decisions can be made with respect to teleological conditions which one holds, or would agree to hold, or appears to hold in common with informal checks on what those teleological assumptions, rather than conditions, are. I wouldn't know how to qualify that statement much more, except to say, that in itself it suggests a methodology. You can say of the categories, or the categorizations (not just parts of speech, which we can regard, let us say, as the simplest one, but the others), that their
a3 rejection is analogous, or in some way related (through rejection of the distinction between the minutae and the maximae of one's discourse). To put oneself in a situation where one's saying not 'I don't know what an object of interest or concern (or what reflective self-embedded kind of discourse about one's capacity to mean or chat, or whatever it is) might be like,' is to suggest that the items of this are not, as far as one can see, clearly seen (insofar as we're not sure of the social level, the psychological level and other levels). One would be hard put to put a grade, a scale, on this sort of relationship(s). Similarly with a category. One would not want at this stage to put a degree of universality of a given set of properties which would be the mark of a category. It's not that one's saying that categories will never be useful...I mean I have a feeling at the same time, that if we are going to take seriously the injunction about what one's doing not (at least) being a generalized science related to sort of scientific ideals as to what for example, a linguistics study might be - then you can get away with saying categorizations won't do. At any rate...each piece of discourse is only dealt with in terms of categories (insofar as these categories are a participatory habituation) or, in other words, so long as the conditions or set of functions exist to interpret or support a categorization. I wouldn't have thought that they lasted or were any more capable of scientific systemization than that. That's what I mean, you know the categories represent odd sets. If we are going to end up with 'out-of-the-blueness', for example.

The notion of one piece of information next to another? And that mounting to the relation. Yes, minimal kinds of decisions as to semioticness, etc... I think the work - what we are doing now - is ('he says without worrying about David Kaplan's problems about the scare quotes') is piddling around with a set of parameters, which anyway we haven't exhausted, or dealt with, in terms of sufficient distinctions. We haven't put ourselves in a situation to denumerate or enumerate any exhaustive set of the conditions which supervene or intervene or are present in relation to any piece of discourse. If you're asking what seeing your situation as problematic can amount to, then it seems to me that you'r asking certain sorts of questions, like 'what kinds of meaning are there in one's discourse which so far have not been discovered?' - you know...in one's interaction if you like...in relation to what sets, for example, of approximately
a4 equivalent lexis, grammars, etc. would these sorts of meanings be accessible? Well, they're not accessible in terms of...I was looking at your, that guy's. hymn about Markov models...They're certainly not accessible in terms of Markov source because the whole point about the Monte Carlo method when one is talking about actually how many symbols are generated is that it's based on the definition of the machine anyway - it's in the definition of the machine.

I suspect our Markov machine is a good deal more complex than the world.

It's very doubtful it would be a machine.

The model in the physical sense, in the mathmatical sense is just too over-complicated. I don't think that state-transition... for example, we could say, 'O.K.', we think of one thing following from another as a set of transitions from state to state'... But that's not what one means when one's talking about one thing being next to another - because one is not assuming there is a state-transition. You know that it can be adequately expressed in terms of a state-transition generating symbols. I don't see that it can because the... alright, in the case of the Markov model it's only a Markov source which, as far as I can see, that guy didn't point out very clearly... the chat, the string that you're dealing with... the actual generation position may well, if you like be closed, to a great extent, by what objections we found in that article which is about the adequacy of surface information - surface data rather. Where, alright, you could have a situation in which a transformational set of discoveries, or a transformational position, would be adequate... but at the same time the adequacy of learning... you know... the actual position of knowing, the epistemics of learning and the actual business of acquisition would be left untouched. I think if we then say, 'O.K., in that case we think that there is something in the way, it may well have much to do with the way it's acquired.' Alright... the simple sense... the way we've continued on. We've got to start thinking about the way it's acquired perhaps a good deal more explicitly than can be achieved through the consideration of its acquisition in this form. I mean that's what transformational grammar tells you. I don't think, for example, that, 'Oh well, we want to relate it to our intuitions about how it is acquired'... I don't think we are saying there is anything basic... the
a5 actual dynamics of acquisition of what?... of a possibility of continuation. I mean there are so many acrosocial, macrosopic items in our experience which we have to take into account. We cannot be linguists. I think the mistake that was liable to be made, apropos the Red Guard position earlier on was a mistake of assuming that somehow linguistics contained the answers. And what really is the case is that linguistics has merely shown the inadequacy of philosophy to deal with the problems that philosophy purported to deal with.

It's also be slightly recursive as well, linguistics has tended to show the inadequacy of linguistics in a strange sort of way. Insofar as, in some sense, it can be seen as a sort of successor to philosophy in one direction.

You brought up the idea of recursiveness of that kind of pronouncement. It seems to me that we can't assume... aren't in a position to say... whether there is any genuine recursion or any lack of recursion in whatever we might regard going-on as or not.

Regarding going-on - he has no problems, it literally is scratching your arse.

No wonder he has a dry nose... it would make me fucking leave as well Rex.

Where was I?

'Apropos'... it was about the linguistics thing.

No, it's going-on... going on. I've often wondered about this notion of going-on. I mean, is it a positivistic notion? Is it at base positivist? Do we look at it like that? Or is it simply as near as you can get to sort of lifting your hands to natural laws?

Isn't going-on sort of nested in the sense that it's about actually asking whether what one means is, 'I'm going-on with respect to a set of prescriptions existing in some antecedent plans or practice,' or something like that? Do you mean positivist in that sense? Or do you mean positivist in that sense where it could be merely a matter of empirical sociology for someone else? Aren't these the questions that saying to yourself, so to speak, 'I'll go-on' involves ...I don't think it is a question - what I mean is I think it's pragmatic.

Yeah, but what I'm suggesting is, have we got the choice of saying 'I'll go-on?' Is it a real choice? Or is it something that we can't help?

I think it's something that you can't help. I think at the same time it's something that when you say 'I'll go-on' confronting the string or uttering the string (and presumably the psychocultural, philosophical, epistemological idices of 'I'll go-on')... it's grammar to an extent... and it is that which presumably concerns one.

To classify it... or codify it... classify it, I suppose, as grammatical is not to belittle it.

No, indeed.

That, I guess, is how we see the sort of marrow of the thing.

It would be interesting to find out what kind of set of strings would be generated in terms of what apparatus we have available in the context of the problem of the grammaticality, or the grammatical basicness, of 'I'll go-on'... I mean, 'what kind of transformationality does it have? for example might be an interesting thing. It's not more existential than linguistic was.

When we start talking about things like this I start ticking over the whole business of some kind of epoche, or transcendentalism. I know you need to be
wary of terms like that, but it's like having no choice but to consult them -
things as bizarre as that... once you expand your programme to take in things,
making just 'I'm going-on' problematic... or 'can I go-on?'... or... 'will I
a6 go-on?'... however you want to use it, I don't think epoche is any good,
But it wasn't epoché... I was really... some of the ideas have been sorted out
in terms of some kind of transcendentalism. Would you hold a relation between
treating 'I'll go-on' as grammatical, and the notion of an act of faith or
something like that coming in?

Well, that's a good point because treating 'I'll go-on' as grammatical is anyway dealing with the problem of 'I'll go-on'... the grammaticalness of 'I'll go-on'... it is a grammatical statement. The problem may be, if you like, associated with the reflexiveness of the grammaticalness of that statement. One's then in a position to ask oneself what is there that's grammatical about it? But it seems to work grammatically insofar as the kinds of ways that we seem to be thinking of grammar are associated with a kind of generalized paradoxical deontology, more than a kind of choice situation... more than a kind of adequacy situation. To say a string is obligatory in a sense, is to say that it's got no structure. But that may be not what one means by generalizable ... one may mean highly weakened politics. I think it's grammatical politics ... You know that one's grammar is much more like politics than it's like grammar. Certainly it's unlike Chomskyan grammar. It's merely an ad hoc method (position). Now when you were asking about a transcendentality... when you say 'but that is within the possibility of transcendentality'... like you're saying 'it's an act of faith' or something like that. Now, if one's
a7 a8 saying 'I'll go-on', it seems to me that what Kierkegaard's act of faith is saying is, 'I will seek to pursue and take on that which ensues on various logical dimensions, both rationally and irrationally and so on, what ensues, if you like, from this facet of my autobiography.' (And from the relation between this facet of my autobiography and the mapping of this onto the world's.) The transcendental comes, I think, from saying 'this shall be basic'.

This shall be?

Well, I think, as I was saying to Lynn, I don't think we ever produce Concluding Unscientific Postscripts.

That just expands the deontology as well, that remark.

Yeah, well.

We shall treat this as basic...

The point is it's not arbitrary: presumably one's saying 'we shall treat this as basic', in a sense which, for example, a statistician would think of something as being arbitrary - it's not that - it's not saying 'we've got to have something.' If you have the problem of saying 'you've got to have something' given, if you like, the fact that we are not turning any of these into objects of contemplation - then to have got something, is again, part of the paradox, and related to Kierkegaard's paradox. I mean, Kierkegaard's position was not only a sort of simple-minded 'against reason' kind of position, it was in fact quite a complexly worked out position in relation to logic. That is, that one's relationship to what was rational disclosed a certain set of possibilities, a certain set of existential possibilities. And I think to that extent we say 'there is a pharos of certain existential possibilities within the group to which one feels, or feels unfortunately he belongs, that's not even basic... for one could belong without knowing... but how strong is that? What are the criteria of participation? If somebody is remote (i. e. is someone with whom there is no degree of sociality vis-a-vis exchange of discourse or whatever) then degree of commonality in relation to existential or pragmatic function commonality may be again an interesting thing to pursue. Your thing about positivism is a very relevant question and one that should be raised time and time again, because we still can't relax, we still don't relax. Maybe it's good... I don't know... that we're partly screwed up. One can be asking oneself very simple things like 'what is there that otherwise would be covered up about the way we've been going-on and the way we're liable to?' That ordinary-language-pat kind of question, it seems to me is the sort of 'grasp' thing of a lot of the way. I think that the kind of people who have been doing a lot of grabbing in the six months have been dealing with things. It is, as it were, the problem of seeing what one does as what one does as distinct from seeing what one does as propadeutical run-up. Again this thing concerning transcendental positions...

That has emerged because we've really hounded ourselves into one long series of corners. You could say that history-wise up to, say, a couple of years ago, we were able to take shifts in terms of some vague rationality, but lately we've been more and more pressed onto what finally amounts to sort of psychological predicates. This is what we were talking about on Friday in Turin. The problem seems to be - we both agreed... there were psychological predicates, but it was a different way of looking for, for example, a notion of interest.

But interest is not a trivial concept.

Certainly not, it appears to be the more and more emerging concept.

Isn't it a function of good faith?

It may be - I wouldn't even like to say that.

Look at the Bar-Hillel disambiguation 'thing' in relation to interest, if you see what I mean.

I think the history of our treatment of our affair with the notion of interest is quite reasonably informative to look at. The last couple of years... the way we tended to handle it a couple of years ago was always to try and sort it out in terms of the notion of 'inquiry' which is a great watch-word of analytical tradition. More and more lately we've tended, I guess, to treat it more mechanically in the sense of looking at various theories of learning. And in attempting to handle the various theories of learning we have brought in what I see as a sort of trip-wire with regard to these psychological predicates. I mean even things like 'feeling' have begun to creep in —

in terms of 'acts of faith' and 'going-on' and so forth.

It seems pointless, if we are going to take that seriously, to be glad or sorry.

We haven't got any choice, it simply has emerged.

If we were to say, for example, 'the dimension of meaning that has been of significance, certainly of late, is the dimension of meaning which inhabits the area ruled out of court by Bar-Hillel, namely the area which is encapsulated, not necessarily adequately by this term, but by the area of good faith.' We could look at it positively, we could say 'well look, people fucking talk, there seem to be ways in which transactions occur and the components thereof seem seldom to be pointed-out.'...We could take it quite positively...if in a positive frame of mind...then one might remind oneself of that. This goes back to this thing about not being able to sloganize one's teleology.

The co-functionality or, perhaps, proportionality of interest and 'good faith' - where 'good faith' suggests non-disambiguation...but it's more complex than this...'good faith' may be an inductive indiscernable - and a grammatical indiscernable - but it's generative, i.e. we can't discount it as 'source'.

Ideology...it's not just that one wants revision - these 'lexical' possibilities
...meanings we seem to be just chasing may be heterogenously ideological.
a9 a10 The indices of ideology...it may be that any revision is a function of inter-
active 'good faith'. Self-consciousness...the indices are just different from,
e.g. Althusser's - and our producing the string of morphs is therefore more
profound...the simplest stories - are just seldom the same stories...but
there's a not '≠ all the time' suggestion in that.

It might be interesting...the rehersal of a half page of Gian Enzo with respect to clearing what kind of impression we do give. Our problems with learning as a version of cultural embedding (so to speak) are worth pointing out with respect to European frameworks of attempted understanding of our problematic. One of the problems, which we did not have in the past, is that it is of specific instrumentality-the actual business of keeping the 'group' together - even though it's not a group...you know talking to whoever you happen to be talking. You can't have sort of 'the executives going to another firm' kind of possibility - it is not in any way open to us at all. Whereas I think it probably was in the grand halcyon days of...

Art-Language.

It is now the situation where to some extent our confrontations with 'les Philosophes' could in the future be a good deal more fruitful than they have in the past. I don't think that's because they'd necessarily be better people for knowing us, but there's a chance they might be in a better position to confront, from their point of view, what we do as more close to raw nature than they have been persuaded the earlier activity was.

'Raw nature' there doesn't mean to imply a non-ideological practice does it?

Oh no, but they would probably be inclined to see it like that. That's what I mean - it's not that. But it's non-ideological in one sense. I don't think it's tied-up terribly well together with an actual ideology inasmuch as I think we've got a revision on what the closure conditions of holding an ideology might be. I think that there is a revision on that. These are quite basic psychological revisions... and I think more basic than we would have thought a while ago. I would have thought that prior to getting into that dictionary, for example, that a lot of those problems could have easily been settled with an adequate refurbishing of epistemology - sufficient to be able to deal with a concept of extra-linguistic context. That's still on the books, I presume.

I wonder if it is - in relation to what we talked about earlier. The notion of extra-linguistic context...I mean are you saying there that linguistics can treat extra-linguistic context?

No, normally linguistics wouldn't be able to because of the epistemological parameters of treating it. Richard Montague might talk about that - points of reference, but he couldn't ever stop to think what he was saying. I mean he never stopped to ask himself what all the points of reference might be, or what all the indices might be. What use is a time and a place? How exhaustive or adequate? The sort of topographical and the chronological ...you know, what sort of set of indices does regarding that as potentially encapsulating an idea of an exhaustive set involve? What I was really saying was that linguistics wouldn't be able to...it would have to cut out that concept on the same grounds in a way that machine translation would have to purely because of the amount of information that would have to be stored. I'm not sure that there isn't a way in which certain restrictions of extra-linguistic context (different restrictions from the ones which are nearly cut-out by the epistomological remarks) might be considered. I think the revision is something approaching - 'How does restriction of extra-linguistic context relate to what we were talking about earlier, namely going-on?' What would a restriction of knowledge of the world vis-a-vis that be? I mean that's only a kind of lame-brained sort of example. But I think that in a way it's only off the books to the extent that talking about context at one stage was merely a way of reminding ourselves of the sort of situation where we were pushing ourselves into an ignotium per ignotius...a sort of epistemological shit-heap compounded by an epistemological shit-heap. I don't think ultimately that it's far too general to be something we can actually approach, except, as it were, via that generated by other slogans (social context). But there is a question of how you approach any question of context. And asking yourself questions about the limits on your epistemology. At what point you're going to be alleging that you have reached something which is equivalent to an epistemological point?...

the set you're dealing with, the set comprising points for instance is again equivalent to, or perhaps literally, the epistemologically accessible. It's a question perhaps not only of epistemology, but I would have thought that the concept of epistemological accessibility was related quite closely to the possibility of changing one's idea of what an epistemology might be - what is going to count, as it were, as e.g. peripheral and permissible knowledge? What is going to count, for example, as an asymptote, or approximate equivalent of, exhaustiveness?

Does that sound fanciful?

No, it seems to me to be... these kinds of questions seem fairly well embedded in what we are doing. They don't seem arbitrary at all, in any sense. It's just that some terms in the terminology in a sense have their own problems - like 'the epistemological shit-heap' - just using that term actually adds to the shit-heap in a sense.

a 01 Read (1) 'B shut al B your mouth Cal' as 'the blurting production of "shut" as discourse indexed al blurtingly produces "your mouth" as discourse indexed al ... and described as "going-on" in al'.

(Elegance here, what about order?)

From this, accept that it's natural to interpret (1) (malformed formula) as a statement to the effect that 'shut' is an (early) first-place member of (this) talking-to-each-other (go-on) relation, and 'your mouth' is a second- (later) place member thereof. Sometimes, we might want to call or think of later-place members as 'transformation subjects al'.

a 01* Simple categories (so much for speech)

There might be lots of ways to express a lot of this ... what are the advantages? We don't have the dictionary ... this is not rational ... it's what we may want though, isn't it?

So, down to the simple types - and drop a bit of the overweight notation.

Accept (e. g.) that:

xal = 'shut'
y = 'your mouth'
Cal = 'going-on'

Df. 1)
Any set (?)

(xal, (y, Cal)) :	Bxal By Cal	is a going-on al relation of type (i)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	Bxal By n Cal	is ... etc. type (ii). (Think of 'n' as indicating 'failure' ... negation moderation.)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	n Bxal By n Cal	type (iii)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	n Bxal By Cal	type (iv)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	Bxal n By Cal	type (v)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	Bxal n By n Cal	type (vi)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	n Bxal n By Cal	type (vii)
(xal, (y, Cal)) :	n Bxal n By n Cal	type (viii)

The simple types are too strong (and they're silly in application most of the time). Don't worry about why at the moment, but a fairly exhaustive characterization of ... going-on relations can be obtained from constellations of the simple types, i. e. from the four schemata Bxal By Cal, Bxal By n Cal, (simplified to) Bx n By Cal, Bx n By n Cal, one can obtain 4^2 'basic types'.

a 02

	A1		B1		C1		D1	
1	n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
2	n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
3	n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
4	Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
5	n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
6	n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
7	n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
8	Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
9	Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
10	n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
11	Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
12	Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
13	Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
14	Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
15	n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
16	Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal

Some of the constellations are sets which don't represent satisfiable formulae ... are we interested in satisfaction? There are other combinations: forget them. 1-6 are sets which represent satisfiable formulae. 7-16 are molecular (and) complex expressions capable of weakening 1-6 when concatenated therewith.

The application of a whole (four element) concatenation expression ('line') involves a structural (concatenatory) hybrid of degree 1. This indicates a mesomeric (type 1) 'directional' grammatical situation.

a 1 (proper)

B cannot + B be Cal n B cannot + B be n Cal n B cannot + n B be Cal n B cannot + B be n Cal B cannot be + B sloganized Cal B cannot be + sloganized n Cal n B cannot be + n B sloganized Cal n B cannot B + n B sloganized n Cal

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (a 2) piece of grammatical 'information'. Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

a 1. 1

B I + B don't Cal n B I + B don't n Cal ...

a 1. 2

I + Pron + Count + Person ...

a 2

n B I + B don't Cal n B I + B don't n Cal B I + n B don't Cal n B I + n B don't n Cal + B I don't + B understand n Cal B I don't + n B understand n Cal B I don't + B understand Cal n B I don't + n B understand Cal

Guess which one of the following is a part of the next (a 3) piece of grammatical 'information'. Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

a 2. 1

B 'Darling' + n B she said n B 'Darling' + B she said ...

a 2. 2

B rejection + B of Cal B rejection + B of n Cal B rejection + n B of Cal B rejection + n B of n Cal ...

a 3

B rejection + B of Cal B rejection + B of n Cal B rejection n B of Cal B rejection + n B of n Cal B rejection of + n B the n Cal n B rejection of + n B the n Cal n B rejection of the + B distinction Cal B rejection of the + B distinction n Cal B rejection of the n B distinction Cal B rejection of the n B distinction n Cal

Guess which one of the following is a part of the next (a 4) piece of grammatical information. Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

a 3. 1

Michael Baldwin is talking to Terry Atkinson here ...

a 3. 2

3 meanings + n B be Cal n B meanings + B be Cal ...

a 4

B meanings + n B be Cal n B meanings + B be Cal B meanings B be accessible Cal n B meanings + B be accessible n Cal B meanings n B be accessible Cal B meanings + n B be accessible n Cal

Guess which one of the following is a part of the next (a 5) piece of grammatical information. Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

a 4.1

B meanings + n B be Cal n B meanings + B be Cal B meanings B be accessible ...

a 4.2

B meanings ... B be Cal B meanings B be + n B accessible ...

a 5

B meanings . . . B be Cal B meanings be + n B accessible Cal n B meanings be + n B accessible n Cal

Guess which one of the following is a part of the next (a 6) piece of grammatical information. Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

a 5. 1

Will go-on + VB + psychological + intention + modal . . . tense . . . future

a 5. 2

B be + B cannot n Cal

a 6

B be + B cannot n Cal

Guess which one of the following is a part of the next (a 7) piece of grammatical information. Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

a 6.1

B " + B I'll Cal n B " + I'll B go-on Cal

a 6.2

B " + B . . . " Cal . . .

a 7

B " + B . . . " Cal B " + n B . . . " n Cal

Guess which one of the following is a part of the next (a 8) piece of grammatical information. Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

a 7. 1

B I'll + B go-on Cal n B I'll + n B go-on Cal B I'll go-on + n B we'll go-on n Cal

a 7. 2

B act of + n B faith n Cal . . .

a 8

I'll + x
We'll + z
Go-on + y

Cal + B we'll go-on
Bx + By Cal n Bx + n By Cal Bz + By Cal n Bz + n By Cal
Bzy + n B unspecified n Cal

Guess which one of the following is a part of the next (a 9) piece of grammatical information. Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

a 8.1

B cannot + B be Cal n B cannot + B be n Cal ...

a 8.2

Bx + By Cal Bx + By n Cal n Bx ...

a 9

n B revision + B is a function Cal n B revision + B is a function n Cal n B revision + n B is a function Cal n B revision + n B is a function n Cal ...

Guess which one of the following is a part of the next (a 10) piece of grammatical information. Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

a 9.1

(xal, (y, Cal)) : Bxal By n Cal

a 9.2

Bx + By Cal Bx + By n Cal n Bx + n By Cal n Bx + n By n Cal + Bx + n Bz ...

a 10

Bx + By Cal Bx + By n Cal n Bx + n By Cal n Bx n By n Cal + Bx + n Bz Cal n Bx + n Bz n Cal where Bx + Bz Cal Bx + Bz n Cal n Bx + Bz Cal n Bx n Bz n Cal

a 10.1

Either go-on reading from where you left off, or go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

Supplementary Instruction Index a

a 1.2 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

a 4.2 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 8.1 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

a 7.1 Go back to a 5 in the text and start again from there.

a 1.1 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 2.1 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

a 4.1 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

a 5.2 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 7.1 Go back to a 5 in the text and start again from there.

a 3.1 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 4.2 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 3.2 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 9.1 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

a 6.1 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

a 1.2 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

a 5.1 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 7.2 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

a 2.2 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 8.2 Forget about the rewrite hints in a 7; go-on reading from where you left off.

a 9.2 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 6.2 Go-on reading from where you left off.

a 8.1 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

Instruction Index b x

Several items of grammatical/mapping information (b 1-b 13) are indexed in the transcript text (b 001). These items (b 1-b 13) should be referred to in the same order as they are indexed in the text one at a time. (For example, b 1 should be referred to when it is indexed in b 001 and replaced before going-on to b 2 . . . and so on.) Where an item is indexed more than once, and (in the first instance) in the same place as one of a lower order, it should be referred to (and its pathway followed, etc.) alternately as the pathway of its fellow reaches the next index point. Each occurrence of an index letter and number is to be regarded as discrete with respect to any other, i. e. a grammatical/mapping item is to be referred to and its pathway followed independently every time it is indexed in the text (b 001).

b 001

I was really concerned to voice a few feelings about book
learning and a few reservations about what we mean typically
b 1 by 'structure' with respect to our discourse. I've
wanted to consider ways of being concerned to map some
of these reservations onto the function sets dealing with
the problem of ideology. The problem is, I feel, not to
be addressed in a conventional locus of structurism.
Ideology is not something we can merely revise ... it is
only a set of reverberative conditions that is pervading
b 2 our experience.

To regard discourse as something which is revised in the
way we revise involves a notion regarded very desperately
by 'logic'. In relation to this sort of problem (which is
both historical and methodological) one would want to map
b 3, b 7 epistemological universes, etc. ... which are perhaps
to some extent related to (like) 'how much congruence is
expressed in these set conditions?', 'what if anything is
this revision?' and 'what are a few outside suggestions?'
We have replaced angst with the grammar of going-on
b 4 (concatenation) Cal.

And what is, if you like, the interest in problematic in
b 5, b 6, relation to the profounder content of the concatenation?
b 3 What is outside suggestability? This and a number of
other issues are at hand. We'd better start thinking around
a question (which is situationally very broad). How is it
that we regard ourselves, or, if you like, how is it that we
b 7 regard our discourse as in any way structural?

One thing I might point out parenthetically is that Koestler
quote of Terry's ... The apparent derisive frame of mind
is all shit. (I mean waves, speed, the like can be dealt
with in terms of resonance and other fairly homely sorts
of ideas.) And it seems to me that worrying about historical
perplexities (which, faute de mieux, all the methodological
perplexities of apparent scientific development add
b 8, b 12 up to) is trivial ... with respect to one's being able to deal
with whatever possibility of activity (qua homo religiosius)
b 9, b 4 one has.

Now, the typical idea behind the idea of structure is that
the notion of a cardinally accessible whole is epistemologically
b 10, b 6 normal. Activity is restricted to the consideration
of relations between parts in the finite system. It seems
to me that if we're mapping with a ceteris paribus of the

notion 'whole', the only mode that we have is in fact expressed as an heuristic dynamic based on whatever teleological assumptions are made, instantiated - 'lived', as it were - in relation to whatever existentializing set conditions there may be. b 11 We might be able to regard (e. g.) teleology as characterized in some sense by the formalizables/formalizings (in some limited degree) as they appear in relation to set conditions, universes of discourse. b 12, b 5 But are they characterized by formal relations among these parts? b 13 Then what could be regarded as constituting a structural formula? Now, we don't have structural formulae, we have what are fondly regarded as malformations ... only approaching the conditions of satisfaction ... as ... formed.

b 01 Read (1) 'B shut al B your mouth Cal' as 'the blurting production of "shut" as discourse indexed al blurtingly produces "your mouth" as discourse indexed al ... and described as "going-on" in al'.

(Elegance here, what about order?)

From this, accept that it's natural to interpret (1) (malformed formula) as a statement to the effect that 'shut' is an (early) first-place member of (this) talking-to-each-other (go-on) relation, and 'your mouth' is a second-(later) place member thereof. Sometimes we might want to call or think of later-place members as 'transformation subjects al'.

b 01* Simple categories (so much for speech)

There might be lots of ways to express a lot of this ... what are the advantages? We don't have the dictionary ... this is not rational ... it's what we may want though, isn't it?

So, down to the simple types - and drop a bit of the overweight notation.

Accept (e. g.) that:

xal = 'shut'
y = 'your mouth'
Cal = 'going-on'

Df. 1)
Any set (?)

(xal, (y, Cal)) : Bxal By Cal	is a going-on al relation of type (i)
(xal, (y, Cal)) : Bxal By n Cal	is ... etc. type (ii) (Think of 'n' as indicating 'failure' ... negation moderation.)
(xal, (y, Cal)) : n Bxal By n Cal	type (iii)
(xal, (y, Cal)) : n Bxal By Cal	type (iv)
(xal, (y, Cal)) : Bxal n By Cal	type (v)
(xal, (y, Cal)) : Bxal n By n Cal	type (vi)
(xal, (y, Cal)) : n Bxal n By Cal	type (vii)
(xal, (y, Cal)) : n Bxal n By n Cal	type (viii)

The simple types are too strong (and they're silly in application most of the time). Don't worry about why at the moment, but a fairly exhaustive characterization of ... going-on relations can be obtained from constellations of the simple types, i. e. from the four schemata Bxal By Cal, Bxal By n Cal, (simplified to) Bx n By Cal, Bx n By n Cal, one can obtain 4^2 'basic types'.

b 02

	A1		B1		C1		D1	
1	n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
2	n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
3	n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
4	Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
5	n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
6	n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
7	n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
8	Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
9	Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
10	n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
11	Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
12	Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
13	Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
14	Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
15	n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
16	Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal

Some of the constellations are sets which don't represent satisfiable formulae ... are we interested in satisfaction? There are other combinations: forget them. 1-6 are sets which represent satisfiable formulae. 7-16 are molecular (and complex expressions capable of weakening 1-6 when concatenated therewith.

The application of a whole (four element) concatenation expression ('line') involves a structural (concatenatory) hybrid of degree 1. This indicates a mesomeric (type 1) 'directional' grammatical situation.

b 03 An additional concatenatory relation (hybrid of degree 2) is introduced. It is indicated by 'H' in the concatenatory expression. The structural hybridity here reflects a tactic 'reversability' (i. e. the teleological 'drag' of the second-place member) of a given pair - there being postulated a degree of tactical contingency ('accidit-ness') in the first-place member

b 03. 1

n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
n Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
Bxal	By Cal	n Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal
n Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	n Bxal	n By Cal	n Bxal	n By n Cal
Bxal	By Cal	Bxal	By n Cal	Bxal	n By Cal	Bxal	n By n Cal

n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal
n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal
n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal
Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal
n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal
n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal

b 04 Modality List

This is as picturesque as possible.

M1. Commit One to Rampton
M2. Ideology Revision/Ideology Possibility
M3. Get through this Hiatus
M4. Sociality/Socialization
M5. Dialogic Good Faith/Bad Faith
M6. Having a Problem: Seing One's Situation as Problematic

b 1 (proper) -emic fragments (pairing members) are assigned (guess) modalities. These are index sets of a kind.

... I was (M3) ... really concerned (M3, M4) ...

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 2) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 1. 1 The various (complex) concatenation set (expressions) 1-16 ABCD may be assigned 'ideology/teleology' modalities.

b 1. 2 ... I was (M5, M6, M7) ... really concerned (M5, M6...) ...

b 2 The various (complex) concatenation set (expressions) 1-16 ABCD may be assigned 'ideology/teleology' modalities.

M4 n B I was (M3) + B really concerned (M3, M4) Cal, n B I was (M3) + B really concerned (M3, M4) n Cal, n B I was (M3) + n B really concerned (M3, M4) Cal, n B I was (M3) + n B really concerned (M3, M4) n Cal,

M6 n B I was (M3) + B really concerned (M3, M4) Cal, n B I was (M3) + B really concerned (M3, M4) n Cal, n B I was (M3) + n B really concerned (M3, M4) Cal, B I was (M3) + n B really concerned (M3, M4) n Cal,

M3 n B I was (M3) + B really concerned (M3, M4) Cal, B I was (M3) + B really concerned (M3, M4) n Cal, B I was (M3) + n B really concerned (M3, M4) Cal, B I was (M3) + n B really concerned (M3, M4) n Cal,

M3 n B I was (M3) + B really concerned (M3, M4) Cal, n B I was (M3) + B really concerned (M3, M4) n Cal, B I was (M3) + n B really concerned (M3, M4) Cal, B I was (M3) + n B really concerned (M3, M4) n Cal.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 3) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 2. 1 The topic modalities here indicated for each set (expression) are 'weak' with respect to specificity. The concatenation weakening ('out-of-the-blue') expressions are richer, i. e. complex topic modality hybrids.

b 2. 2 (M1) . . . I was (M3, M4) . . . really concerned (M3, M4) . . . I was . . .

b 3 The topic modalities here indicated for each set (expression) are 'weak' with respect to specificity. The concatenation weakening ('out-of-the-blue') expressions are richer, i. e. complex topic modality hybrids.

Expressions of the 'H' group are different from 1-6 (from which they are derived) as to modality index.

A1	B1	C1	D1	
n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	M4
n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	M6
n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	M3
Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	M2
n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	M5
n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	M1
n Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	M3, 6
Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	M1, 6
Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	M3
n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	M1, 5
Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	M1, 4, 3
Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	M1, 3
Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	M1, 3
Bxal By Cal	n Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	M3, 6
n Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	n Bxal n By Cal	n Bxal n By n Cal	M1, 5
Bxal By Cal	Bxal By n Cal	Bxal n By Cal	Bxal n By n Cal	M3, 6
A1H	B1H	C1H	D1H	
n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	M5
n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal	M3
n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	Bxal H n By n Cal	M4
Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	n Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	M2
n Bxal H By Cal	Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	M6
n Bxal H By Cal	n Bxal H By n Cal	Bxal H n By Cal	n Bxal H n By n Cal	M1

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 4) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 3.1 n B was really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) Cal,
n B was really (M1, M2) + B

b 3.2 Really —— Adv —— Degree —— Quantify —— ...

b 4

M 6 n B was really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) Cal, n B was really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) n Cal, n B was really (M1, M2) + n B concerned to (M1) Cal, n B was really (M1, M2) + n B concerned to (M1) n Cal,

M2 n B was really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) Cal, n B was really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) n Cal, n B was really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) Cal, B was really (M1, M2) + n B concerned to (M1) n Cal,

M1 n B was really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) Cal, B was really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) Cal, n B was really (M1, M2) + n B concerned to (M1) Cal, n B was really (M1, M2) + n B concerned to (M1) n Cal,

M3 B was really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) Cal, B was
M6 really (M1, M2) + B concerned to (M1) n Cal, B was really (M1, M2) + n B concerned to (M1) Cal, B was really (M1, M2) + n B concerned to (M1) n Cal.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 5) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 4.1 Really —— Adv —— Degree —— Quantify

b 4.2 n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) n Cal ...

b 5

M4 n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) n Cal, n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + n B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + n B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) n Cal,

M6 n B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, n B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal, n B I was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, B I was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal,

M5 n B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal, B I was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, n B I was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal,

M1 B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, B I
M6 was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal, B I
was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, n B
I was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal,

n B I was really (. . .) H + B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, n B I was really (. . .) H + B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal, B I was really (. . .) H + n B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, n B I was really (. . .) H + n B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 6) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 5. 1 n Bxal By Cal Bxal By n Cal Bxal n By Cal
Bxal n By n Cal

b 5. 2 A whole concatenation expression can be assigned an 'M' index: things get clearer, perhaps as items get 'grosser'.

b 6 A whole concatenation expression can be assigned an 'M' index: things get clearer, perhaps as items get 'grosser'.

M3

M4 n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) n Cal, n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + n B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M1, M3, M6) + n B concerned to voice (M1, M3, M6) n Cal,

M6 n B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, n B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal, n B I was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, B I was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal,

M5 n B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal, B I was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, n B I was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal,

M1 B I was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, B I
M6 was really (. . .) + B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal, n B I
was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal, n B I
was really (. . .) + n B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal,

n B I was really (. . .) H + B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal,
n B I was really (. . .) H + B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal,
B I was really (. . .) H + n B concerned to voice (. . .) Cal,
n B I was really (. . .) H + n B concerned to voice (. . .) n Cal.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 7) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 6.1 'I was really concerned to voice': what this is about is . . .

b 6.2

M2

M6 n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) n Cal . . .

b 6.1 Go back to b 01* and start again from there.

b 7

M2

M6 n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) n Cal, n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + n B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) Cal, B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + n B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) n Cal,

M2 B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) n Cal, n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + n B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) n Cal,

M3 B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + B concerned to voice (M4,
M6 M5, M6) Cal, B I was really (M4, M5, M6) + B concerned
to voice (M4, M5, M6) n Cal, B I was really (M4, M5, M6)
+ n B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) Cal, B I was really
(M4, M5, M6) + n B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) n Cal,

M1 n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) H + B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) H + B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) n Cal, B I was really (M4, M5, M6) H + n B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) Cal, n B I was really (M4, M5, M6) H + n B concerned to voice (M4, M5, M6) n Cal.

This is absurd.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 8) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 7.1

M2

M3 n B I was really (M3, M4) + B concerned to voice (M3, M4) Cal . . .

b 7.2

M2

M5 n B I was really (M1, M5) + B concerned to voice (M1, M5) Cal, B I was really (M1, M5) + B concerned to voice (M1, M5) n Cal . . .

b 8

M2

M3 n B I was really (M3, M4) + B concerned to voice (M3, M4) Cal, n B I was really (M3, M4) + B concerned to voice (M3, M4) n Cal, B I was really (M3, M4) + n B concerned to voice (M3, M4) Cal, B I was really (M3, M4) + n B concerned to voice (M3, M4) n Cal,

M1 n B I was really (M3, M4) + B concerned to voice (M3, M4) Cal, n B I was really (M3, M4) + B concerned to voice (M3, M4) n Cal, B I was really (M3, M4) + n B concerned to voice (M3, M4) Cal, n B I was really (M3, M4) + n B concerned to voice (M3, M4) n Cal,

M3 B I was really (M3, M4) + B concerned to voice (M3, M4)
M6 Cal, n B I was really (M3, M4) + B concerned to voice (M3,
M4) n Cal, B I was really (M3, M4) + n B concerned to
voice (M3, M4) Cal, B I was really (M3, M4) + n B concerned to voice (M3, M4) n Cal,

M2 B I was really (M3, M4) H + B concerned to voice (M3, M4) Cal, n B I was really (M3, M4) H + B concerned to voice (M3, M4) n Cal, n B I was really (M3, M4) H + n B concerned to voice (M3, M4) Cal, n B I was really (M3, M4) H + n B concerned to voice (M3, M4) n Cal.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 0) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 8.1

M3

M4 n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) + B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) Cal.

b 8.2

M5

. . . I was (M3) . . . really concerned (M3, M1) . . .

b 9

M3

M4 n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) + B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) + B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) n Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) + n B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) + n B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) n Cal,

M1 n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) + B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) + B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) n Cal, B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) + n B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) + n B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) n Cal,

M1 n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) H + B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) H + B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) n Cal, B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) H + n B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (. . .) H + n B a few feelings about book learning (. . .) n Cal.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 10) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 9.1

M3

M4 n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) + B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) Cal . . .

b 9.2 n B I was really concerned to voice (M2) + B a few feelings about book learning (M2) Cal . . .

b 10

M3

M4 n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) + B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) + B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) n Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) + n B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) + n B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) n Cal,

M1 n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) + B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) + B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) n Cal, B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) + n B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) + n B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) n Cal,

M1 n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) H + B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) H + B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) n Cal, B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) H + n B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) Cal, n B I was really concerned to voice (M3, M4, M6) H + n B a few feelings about book learning (M3, M4, M6) n Cal.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 11) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 10.1

M2

M2 B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) + B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) Cal ...

b 10.2

M3

M4 n B I was really concerned to voice (...) + B a few feelings about book learning (...) Cal ...

b 11

M2

M2 B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) + B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) + B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) n Cal, n B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) + n B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) + n B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) n Cal,

M1 n B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) + B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) + B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) n Cal, B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) + n B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) + n B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) n Cal,

M2 n B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) H + B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) H + B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) n Cal, n B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) H + n B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) Cal, B we'd better (M2, M3, M6) H + n B start thinking (M2, M3, M6) n Cal.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 12) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 11.1

M2

M2 B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal . . .

b 11.2

M2

M5 n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal . . .

b 12

M2

M2 B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal, n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + n B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + n B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal,

M1 n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal, B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + n B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + n B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal,

M6 B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal, B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + n B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) + n B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal,

M2 n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) H + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) H + B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal, n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) H + n B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) Cal, n B we'd better start thinking (M2, M3, M6) H + n B around a problem (M2, M3, M6) n Cal.

Guess which one of the following strings is a part of the next (b 13) piece of grammatical mapping (modality mapping). Make your choice, then look it up in the supplementary instruction index.

b 12.1

M1

M2 B A B C D E (. . .) + B F G H I J (. . .) Cal

b 12.2

M2

M6 n B discourse as in any way (. . .) + B structural (. . .) Cal, n B discourse as in any way (. . .) + B structural (. . .) n Cal

b 13

M6

M2 n B discourse as in any way (. . .) + B structural (. . .) Cal,
n B discourse as in any way (. . .) + B structural (. . .) n Cal,
n B discourse as in any way (. . .) + n B structural (. . .) Cal,
B discourse as in any way (. . .) + n B structural (. . .) n Cal,

M3 n B discourse as in any way (. . .) + B structural (. . .) Cal,
B discourse as in any way (. . .) + B structural (. . .) n Cal,
B discourse as in any way (. . .) + n B structural (. . .) Cal,
n B discourse as in any way (. . .) + n B structural (. . .) n Cal,

M3 B discourse as in any way (. . .) + B structural (. . .) Cal,
B discourse as in any way (. . .) + B structural (. . .) n Cal,
B discourse as in any way (. . .) + n B structural (. . .) Cal,
n B discourse as in any way (. . .) + n B structural (. . .) n Cal,

M4 n B discourse as in any way (. . .) H + B structural (. . .) Cal, B discourse as in any way (. . .) H + B structural (. . .) n Cal, B discourse as in any way (. . .) H + n B structural (. . .) Cal, n B discourse as in any way (. . .) H + n B structural (. . .) n Cal.

b 13. 1 Either go-on reading from where you left off or go back to the beginning of the text and start reading again.

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b 3.2 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

b 4.2 Go-on reading from where you left off.

b 2.2 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

b 10.2 Go back to b 3 and start again from there.

b 7.2 Go back to b 5 and start again from there.

b 11.2 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

b 2.1 Go-on reading from where you left off.

b 1.2 Go back to the beginning of the text and start again.

b 9.2 Go back to b 5 and start again from there.

b 6.2 Go-on reading from where you left off.

b 8.2 Go back to b 5 and start again from there.

b 5.2 Go back to b 4 and start again from there.

b 11.1 Go back to b 10 and start again from there.

b 8.1 Go back to b 7 and start again from there.

b 9.1 Go-on reading from where you left off.

b 1.1 Go-on reading from where you left off.

b 3.1 Go-on reading from where you left off.

b 12.2 Go back to b 7 and start again from there.

b 5.1 Go back to b 01 and start again from there.

b 7.1 Go-on reading from where you left off.

b 12.2 Go back to b7 and start again from there.

b 4.1 Go back to b 01 and start again from there.

b 10.1 Go back to b 9 and start again from there.

The statement that there is a body of dialectical discourse (activity) which is not soul-marginal has to be interpreted as meaning that there is actually a case in which an item of dialectical discourse (activity) dd in the virtual domain Dd is satisfied, where dd is such that the conditional dialogical strength c(Xs/dd) gives an equal dialogical strength to all possible specific soul-marginal items Xs.

The statement that there is a body of soul-marginal discourse (activity) which is not dialectical has to be interpreted as meaning that there is actually a case in which an item of soul-marginal discourse (activity) ds in the domain Ds is satisfied, where ds is such that the conditional dialogical strength c(Xd/ds) gives an equal dialogical strength to all possible specific dialectical items Xd.

The statement that there is a body of dialectical discourse (activity) which is not soul-marginal has to correspond to a dialectical statement dd in the virtual domain Dd such that the conditional dialogical strength c(Xs/dd) gives a concentrated weight on a certain region of the soul-marginal spectrum.

The statement that there is a body of soul-marginal discourse (activity) which is dialectical has to correspond to a soul-marginal statement ds in the domain Ds such that the conditional dialogical strength c(Xd/ds) gives a concentrated weight on a certain region of the dialectical spectrum.

Postulate I
Going-on occasionally composes the structure of a lattice Lg. This is to say that it involves a continuously infinite number of propositions and the idea that the number of elements which may be simultaneously conjoined is finite. Dialectical discourse (activity) may be a (Boolean) sublattice Ld of the greater lattice. Soul-marginal discourse (activity) is another Ls.

Postulate II
The two subsets have only two common elements - constant absurdity and truism (teehee, yawn respectively). This is a rejection of the idea that a dialectical item is equivalent to a soul-marginal one.

Postulate III
The conjunction of a dialogical item (≠ yawn) and a soul-marginal one (≠ yawn) may have a meaning (not necessarily a constant absurdity or a truism) except in the case in which it becomes a constant absurdity.

The disjunction of a dialectical item (≠ teehee) and a soul-marginal one (≠ teehee) has a meaning (not necessarily a constant absurdity or a truism) but this is neither a dialectical item nor a soul-marginal one except in the case in which it becomes a constant truism.

Further Points of Reference

1. 'This is redemption not adaptation ...', 52 pp.
2. 'Ramblings (on paradoxes - grammars) ... "going-on" as an n continuum ...', 4 pp.
3. 'The standard systems of logic - terms are surprised to denote ...', 11 pp.
4. 'T. Smith, history, Art & Language seemed in conversation to be concerned to discuss ...', 25 pp.
5. 'Apropos the thesaurus ... can you think of any strategic purposes ...', 5 pp.
6. 'Towards the possibility of ideology/ideology ...', 17 pp.
7. 'A typology of the pragmatics as a list of generalized attitudes logics - defeasible ...', 7 pp.
8. 'If the pairing is done by looking at the a1⟷a2 situation ...', 9 pp.
9. 'As a label for the different works of a particular generation or community of artists ...', 1 p.
10. 'Ideology. Giving a bad word a good use ...', 5 pp.
11. 'Quantification. There is ... etc. ...', 18 pp.
12. 'How many bits of information do we give? What are class-guesses? ... ', 7 pp.
13. 'The mechanical translation project - Florence ... ', 4 pp.
14. 'Questions again: a pragmatics of questions? ...', 9 pp.
15. 'Let's assume that "Grice's pragmatics" represents a position in contradistinction to one that would be useful ...', 8 pp.
16. 'The last point may also be to do with a presupposition about the concept of a speaker ...', 13 pp.
17. 'O.K. We can have tense operators ...', 13 pp.
18. 'Epistemic indefensibility ... "he knows that p but I don't" ...', 9 pp.
19. 'Why shouldn't people pay and pay dearly to know ...', 5 pp.

20. 'Modal qualifier - physical mode . . . ', 1 p.

21. 'Personal construct theory . . . fundamental postulate . . . January '73 . . . ', 5 pp.

22. 'There are further problems to the presuppositions underlying . . . ', 21 pp.

23. 'If you do have definition types - limit . . . terms of the definiens . . . ', 5 index cards.

24. 'What's "making for uncertainty" like? It's different from . . . ', 11 pp.

25. 'Why there's more to us than Katz and Fodor, and . . . semantic theories . . . ', 2 pp.

26. 'α: it can be argued that there is a non-contingent relationship in the role of the fine artist . . . ', 15 pp.

27. 'Learning system on Boolean lattice basis . . . ', 1 p.

28. 'T. Cheng's little nostrum/question . . . ', 1 p.

29. 'You don't belong . . . is that it? . . . ', 1 p.

30. 'The "weaker formulation" in relation to tautology . . . ', 1 p.

31. 'What about the quantification argument - . . . ', 3 pp.

32. 'We have to develop . . . the Apostel suggestion . . . ', 9 pp.

33. 'Some procedural derivation rules . . . in order to set out how . . . ', 8 pp.

34. 'Going-on about intensiveness - I was saying to . . . ', 21 pp.

35. '. . . Exhibits as it were itself as present therefore . . . ', 5 pp.

36. 'The possibility of ideology/is ideology (revision)? . . . ', 5 pp.

37. 'It is clear that our notion of interest . . . ', 3 pp.

38. 'The understanding is more fundamental than speaking . . . ', 6 pp.

39. 'Normality - Gedankenexperiment - number of modalities?', 6 pp.

40. 'Criteria and symptoms: Art & Language . . . ', 5 pp.

41. 'Shows - typology: A) on-going work, B) established reference frameworks ...', 2 pp.

42. '1) We seem to be no exception to the rule: ...', 3 pp.

43. 'Mr. Collins has got a classical failure of nerve ...', 5 pp.

44. 'Linking (dialogue ... an unordered set ...', 1 p.

45. 'We might assume we do have a unique sequence ...', 2 pp.

46. 'T's remarks about his anti-Kantian studies ... anti-Carnapian studies ...', 3 pp.

47. '(T. Smith) I think to start with a question what's the present state of the art? ...', 15 pp.

48. 'The bibliography might be a trifle fraught ...', 1 p.

49. 'Ian: the task is to talk about some issues arising from ...', 10 pp.

50. 'Assuming the speaker is a compilated function ...', 9 pp.

51. 'In dealing with all entities, such theories in particular ...', 3 pp.

52. '"L" Dave's index/further depth consideration ...', 2 pp.

53. 'It seems fairly obvious that the traditional methodological 'style' includes ...', 5 index cards.

54. 'Introduction for Joseph Kosuth ... we might now ask what are the indices ...', 12 pp.

55. 'Art Education. Learnability ... some sort of discussion ...', 21 pp.

56. 'Assuming for the present that the fine art community is in some way a ...', 40 pp.

57. 'Most writing has been dogmatic and positivistic ...', 34 pp.

58. '(Schnelle) and Bloom list sets of determined ...', 8 pp.

59. 'Postscript: forget wff, validity and T-F values and think of "soundness" ...', 11 pp.

60. 'Diagram: logic relations ...', 1 p.

61. 'Abstract expressionism ... "what about the reality of the everyday world" ...', 40 pp.

62. '... the "artist", i.e. we may be saying some funny things ...', 1 p.

63. 'Instructions and questions ... (1) For $(\exists x) AB_1 (x)$ find (x) in the text ...', 140 pp.

64. 'Methodology? Grope notes ... what would an ontic-dialectic miss out ...', 11 pp.

65. '(The 110 pp.)', 110 pp.

66. 'The Old Wine Drinker Transcript'.

67. 'Data ... we are talking Georg Lukacs again ...', 81 pp.

68. 'Vector and Magnitude'.

69. 'A) Succession, a successor? ... B) Fragments? ... C) Parsing?

70. 'Going-on (Cal) ... the (logical) modalities of the concatenations' indexicalizable set strength ...'

71. 'Dear ...'

72. 'Points of Reference, the Hope of Ideology'.

73. 'Dubbing and Bxal ... manifestations'.

74. 'AL and me... What I know, care about... Going-on as Grammar. No money, no prospects... Fear... Starvation...'

75. 'Now - a new interpretational situational possibility - first ...'

75. 'The index, indexing problems are quite interesting. They are coincident with the difficulties ...'

76. 'Postscript. What is shared in Art-Language cannot be given by a simple learnability relation ...'

77. 'Asymptotic relations. If we were looking for any heuristic for this problem ...'

78. 'Introduction to partial problematic. No part of what follows can be construed as an introduction to an art show ...'

79. 'Models and Indexes: Fringe Benefits'.

80. 'The Problem of Context: The Aftermath of Logical Implosion'.

81. 'Exemplary guide to the aviation industry ...'

82. 'Within "art" and life, the presentation of a/the favourable aspect'.

83. 'It may be argued that constitutive rules are not in all respects relativistic ...'

84. 'Everyone's over-rehearsing again ... the Wittgenstein connexion ...'

85. '(09) Proceedings: The Violin and the Cow'.

86. 'a 001 Transcription - 21. 5. 73'.

87. 'Instruction Index a x'.

88. 'We don't make moral claims apart from epistemological claims ... nor do we "parameterize" any modality (in life!) ...'

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